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Abstract
Informal payments are a frequently overlooked source of local public ￿nance in developing
countries. We use microdata from ten countries to establish stylized facts on the magnitude,
form, and distributional implications of this "informal taxation." Informal taxation is wide-
spread, particularly in rural areas, with substantial in-kind labor payments. The wealthy pay
more, but pay less in percentage terms, and informal taxes are more regressive than formal
taxes. Failing to include informal taxation underestimates household tax burdens and revenue
decentralization in developing countries. We discuss various explanations for and implications
of these observed stylized facts.
￿Email: bolken@mit.edu and monica_singhal@harvard.edu. We thank Tim Besley, Ryan Bubb, Steve Coate,
Amy Finkelstein, Ed Glaeser, Roger Gordon, Seema Jayachandran, Henrik Kleven, Wojciech Kopczuk, Stephan
Litschig, Erzo Luttmer, Rohini Pande, Jim Poterba, and numerous seminar participants for comments. We thank
Angelin Baskaran, Octavia Foarta, Angela Kilby, Arash Nekoei, and Yusuf Neggers for excellent research assistance.
We gratefully acknowledge funding from the Harvard University Asia Center (Olken and Singhal), NICHD grant
R03HD051957 (Olken), and the Weatherhead Center for International A⁄airs and the Taubman Center for State and
Local Government (Singhal). We thank Rob Chase and Diane Steele at the World Bank for providing us with data.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the World
Bank or any other institution.1 Introduction
A key function of government is the ￿nance and provision of local public goods. Taxation allows
communities to overcome the free rider problem that would otherwise lead to underprovision of these
goods. In many developing countries, formal direct taxation of households is limited, comprising
only 18% of total tax revenues on average compared with 45% in developed countries (Roger
Gordon and Wei Li 2009).1 Agricultural sectors are often entirely exempt from taxation, and local
taxation is generally quite constrained (Richard M. Bird 1990; Robin Burgess and Nicholas Stern
1993). These facts would suggest that local public goods are primarily ￿nanced outside the local
community, either through direct provision or intergovernmental grants.
Substantial anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that local residents in many communities
throughout the developing world do contribute substantially ￿outside the formal tax system ￿to
the construction and maintenance of local public goods (e.g., Elinor Ostrom 1991). People pay
in both money and labor to these projects, with often complex arrangements determining how
much each household should pay and what penalties apply for those who free ride. Many countries
even have speci￿c vocabulary to describe these systems, such as gotong royong in Indonesia and
harambee in Kenya.
We refer to these mechanisms of ￿nancing of local public goods as ￿informal taxation.￿ We
de￿ne informal taxation as a system of local public goods ￿nance coordinated by public o¢ cials
but enforced socially rather than through the formal legal system.2 Our distinction between formal
and informal (legal versus social enforcement) parallels the use of these terms in the informal
insurance literature (e.g. Robert Townsend 1994). The involvement of public o¢ cials, discussed
in more detail below, distinguishes informal taxation from, for example, provision of local public
goods by charities or other non-governmental organizations.
In this paper, we develop some of the ￿rst systematic micro-evidence on the magnitude, distrib-
1These ￿gures refer to personal income taxation and are calculated from Table 1 of Gordon and Li (2009).
2This is not to be confused with bribe payments, which are occasionally also referred to as informal taxation.
To the best of our knowledge, the system of ￿nancing local public goods through these types of payments was ￿rst
described as informal taxation by Remy Prud￿ homme (1992), who, in his study of local public goods provision in
Zaire, de￿ned informal taxation to include any "nonformal means utilized to ￿nance the provision of public goods
and services."
1utional implications, and forms of informal taxation, using a micro dataset we assembled consisting
of survey data from ten developing countries throughout the world. We then discuss a variety of
potential explanations for the phenomenon and the broader implications of our ￿ndings for public
￿nance and policy in developing countries.
The ￿rst stylized fact we document is that informal taxation is a widespread phenomenon,
and it can form a substantial share of local revenue. The share of households making informal
tax payments is 20% or higher in all but one country in our sample and exceeds 50% in several
countries. Participation rates are always higher in rural areas than in urban areas. Across our
sampled countries, informal taxes generally comprise a small share of household expenditure (0.85%
in the median country) and a modest share of total taxes paid by households (15.7% in the median
country). However, informal taxes can still be an important source of local public ￿nance. In our
Indonesia sample, for example, including informal taxes increases the estimates of the amount of
revenue under local control by over 50%.
The second stylized fact we document is that, within individual communities, informal taxation
is redistributive but regressive. Wealthier households in a community are generally more likely to
participate in informal taxation schemes than poorer households. The elasticity of total payment
with respect to household expenditure is positive but less than one in all countries, indicating
that informal taxes rise with expenditure, but the average informal tax rate (i.e., informal taxes
divided by total expenditure) falls with expenditure. Informal taxation is therefore regressive, but
still provides redistribution if the local public good it ￿nances is valued equally across the income
distribution. Informal taxes are more regressive than formal taxes, both within communities and
when examined in aggregate at the national level.
The third stylized fact we document is that the form of payment di⁄ers from a traditional tax;
in particular, in-kind labor payments play a substantial role in informal taxation. Moreover, both
the participation gradient and the elasticity of payment with respect to household expenditure are
smaller for labor payments than for money payments, so that labor payments are relatively more
important for poorer households. All three stylized facts we observe are remarkably consistent
across countries.
2We then consider a variety of possible explanations for the observed stylized facts. First, infor-
mal taxation may be a response to constraints on the revenue raising capacity of local governments:
informal taxes may be the only way for these governments to meet their demand for public goods.
Second, informal taxation may arise as the solution to a constrained optimal tax problem even when
formal taxation is available. In particular, if communities in developing countries have information
about people￿ s incomes that is not veri￿able by courts (and therefore cannot be used in a formal
tax system), it may be optimal to levy informal taxes to use this information. Third, informal tax
payments may represent a user fee or bene￿ts tax for the associated public goods provided. Finally,
these payments may represent purely voluntary contributions to community projects, motivated by
altruism.
In Section 5, we discuss these (non mutually exclusive) hypotheses as well as their relation
to the empirical evidence on informal taxation. A limit to the constraints on formal taxation
story is that it does not make direct predictions about the form or distribution of payments. In
contrast, the optimal tax story can reconcile many of the observed facts (prevalence in rural areas,
positive income gradients, and the prevalence of labor payments), although we do ￿nd that in
cases where the good is excludable, such as water supplies or schools, informal taxes may behave
more like a type of user fee. Finally, while payments may be at least partly motivated by altruism,
survey evidence from Indonesia suggests that informal tax payments cannot be thought of as purely
akin to charitable contributions: when asked who decides which households should participate, for
example, only 8% of households report that they decide for themselves; 81% report that a local
leader decides.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the existing literature and
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the stylized facts. Section 5 considers various
explanations for the observed stylized facts. Section 6 discusses the implications of our ￿ndings
and concludes.
32 Existing Evidence on Informal Taxation
As noted above, we de￿ne informal taxation as a system for ￿nancing local public goods, charac-
terized by social enforcement and the involvement of public o¢ cials. Qualitative evidence from a
variety of settings suggests that informal taxation is a common form of local ￿nance for the con-
struction and maintenance of public goods such as roads, schools, and water systems throughout
the developing world (e.g., Ostrom 1991), although formal empirical evidence on informal taxation
remains fairly limited. A range of studies have documented the presence of informal taxation in
various countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.3
In many of these countries, informal tax systems appear to form a very important component
of community development. In Indonesia, for example, the concepts of gotong royong (mutual
assistance) and swadaya (self-help) have become deeply institutionalized within local communi-
ties: residents are expected to make labor and monetary payments toward development projects
￿for example, 37% of the cost of village public goods examined by Rao (2004) in Indonesia are
contributed by the community. In Kenya, harambee (pull together) projects accounted for 11.4%
of national development expenditure between 1967 and 1973, and harambee-￿nanced spending on
particular sectors, such as education, matched or exceeded government expenditure (Mbithi and
Rasmusson 1977).
Several patterns emerge from the range of anecdotes and studies of informal taxation. First,
payments do not appear to be chosen by households individually. Rather, expected payments are
generally coordinated by community leaders or a project committee. Households may be expected
to provide a given monetary payment, as in the case of school fees in Kenya (Miguel and Gugerty
2005), or provide a certain number of days of labor (Ostrom 1991; Sharon R. Roseman 1996). In
some cases, there may be a choice between paying in labor or in money (Njoh 2003).
Second, many of these studies document the existence of non-contributers and describe a range
of punishments that may be imposed on such individuals. Miguel and Gugerty (2005) provide
3A non-exhaustive list of countries includes Cameroon (Ambe Njoh 2003), China (Richard S. Eckaus 2003),
India (Vijayendra Rao 2004), Indonesia (Rao 2004; Victoria A. Beard 2007), Kenya (Philip M. Mbithi and Rasmus
Rasmusson 1977; Peter M. Ngau 1987; Barbara P. Thomas 1987; Joel D. Barkan and Frank Holmquist 1989; Edward
Miguel and Mary Kay Gugerty 2005), Nigeria (Joel D. Barkan, Michael L. McNulty, and M.A.O. Ayeni 1991),
Pakistan (Asim Khwaja 2009), Peru (Jaime L. Larrabure 1966), and Zaire (Prud￿ homme 1992).
4several anecdotal examples of social sanctions in the context of school ￿nancing in western Kenya.4
A common sanction is the public announcement of the names of parents who are late with fees;
other forms of sanctions include "sending letters to the homes of parents late with fees, asking local
church leaders to encourage payment during sermons, and making personal visits to the individual
homes of debtors accompanied by the local Chief" (Miguel and Gugerty 2005). Other examples of
punishments include ￿nes (Ostrom 1991) and the denial of access to communal resources, such as
the use of a cattledip (Thomas 1987).5 It is possible that punishments could also include exclusion
from community credit or risk-sharing arrangements or other types of social enforcement, as in the
informal insurance and micro￿nance literatures.
Our own direct experience with informal taxation in a village in Central Java, Indonesia, echoes
many of these themes. In 2002, a village where one of the authors was staying received 29 drums
of raw asphalt from the district government. In order to make use of the raw asphalt to resurface
a road, the village needed to raise funds for additional materials (e.g., ￿nely crushed gravel, coarse
gravel, sand) as well as labor. To solve this problem, the village head called a meeting in the
neighborhood where the road would be built. At that meeting, the village head, neighborhood
head and an informal community leader (a local school teacher) went around the room "assigning"
payments to each household. These payments increased with income: poorer households would
be asked to pay a small amount (usually a few days of labor), whereas wealthier households were
asked to pay in money, with the wealthiest households asked to pay the most. The meeting did
not specify what sanctions would be for non-payment; however, given that payments were assigned
in a public meeting, one can presume that there would have been social pressure applied to those
who failed to meet their assigned payment level.
To the best of our knowledge, quantitative work on the distribution of informal tax burdens has
focused on two countries: Indonesia and Kenya. Beard (2007) ￿nds that Indonesian households
with more assets or more education pay more in labor and money toward informal taxation; those
with high household expenditure pay less. Note that these e⁄ects are not unconditional: regressions
4The paper argues that limited ability to impose social sanctions in ethnically diverse communities leads to lower
￿nancing of local public goods.
5Note that in this case, the cattledip was not the good for which contributions were being raised; rather, it was a
separate (excludable) resource used to enforce contributions.
5include all of these factors as independent variables. In surveys of particular communities in Kenya,
Thomas (1987) ￿nds that labor payments are widespread and that the rich are more likely to make
cash payments than the poor, and Barkan and Holmquist (1989) ￿nd that participation and labor
payments tend to follow an inverse U-shape with respect to landholding while payments in cash
are increasing in landholding.
An open question is whether or not informal tax mechanisms appear similar across the broad
range of countries in which they are observed. In the next sections of the paper, we provide
systematic cross-country evidence to document several stylized facts about informal taxation.
3 Data
We compiled microdata from around the world to create a dataset that covers the phenomenon
of informal taxation in as many countries as possible. We examined over 100 household surveys,
including (but not limited to) every publicly available World Bank Living Standards Measurement
Study (LSMS) survey.6 To be included in our sample, a survey needed to elicit information specif-
ically about payment towards the provision of local public goods. A typical example of such a
question is: "In the last 12 months did you personally or any other member of the household par-
ticipate in any of the following ... participate in the collective construction of community works
(roads, schools etc.)."7 Our sample includes every household survey that met this criterion. We
did not include surveys that asked only about labor sharing agreements among neighbors or con-
tributions to local social organizations or cases in which the labor was clearly compensated, such
as paid public works days.8
In addition to these pre-existing datasets, we designed a special survey module on informal
taxation for the Health and Education Service Survey in Indonesia. This survey module included
detailed questions on labor and monetary payments as well as questions on the decision-making
process and enforcement of informal taxation not available on the other surveys in the sample. The
6The review of surveys was conducted in the summer of 2006.
7Guatemala, National Survey of Living Conditions, 2000.
8It is still possible that in some cases those paying labor are partially compensated by being provided food or
other bene￿ts not observed in our data.
6Indonesia survey was conducted by Gadjah Mada University and The World Bank as a baseline
survey for a poverty-alleviation program. The survey took place in 5 provinces from June-September
2007, and covered a total of 12,000 households in over 2,300 villages. More details about the survey
can be found in Benjamin A. Olken, Junko Onishi, and Susan Wong (2008).
The types of community works mentioned on these surveys include roads, water and sanitation
systems, schools, health centers, dams and irrigation systems, electricity systems, and cleaning of
public roads and areas.9 While we refer to these goods as local public goods, they may be excludable
in some cases. We return to this issue in Section 5.
The resulting sample consists of household surveys from 10 countries: Albania, Ethiopia,
Guatemala, Indonesia, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Panama, the Philippines, Vietnam and Zambia. A
potential concern with our sample of countries is that relevant survey questions are more likely to
be included in countries where the phenomenon is prevalent. However, we can see that informal
taxation is not geographically isolated to a particular region of the world: the sample contains
countries from Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. In addition, as discussed in Section 2,
anecdotal evidence indicates that informal taxation is common in many other countries that are
similar to our sampled countries.
Table 1 provides an overview of our sample of household surveys. The surveys were conducted
between 1997 and 2007, and sample sizes range from approximately 1,500 to 30,000. The surveys
are nationally representative with the exceptions of Ethiopia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, which
were conducted in rural areas only. Indonesia and the Philippines focus on a poorer-than-average
selection of rural areas, since both surveys were conducted as baseline surveys for poverty alleviation
programs. As shown in the table, all surveys contain information on in-kind labor payments toward
public goods; monetary payments and quantity data are available for subsets of countries. Note
that the recall period varies across surveys: while most surveys ask about payments over the past
year, one survey (Philippines) asks only about the previous six months and two surveys (Nicaragua
and Zambia) ask about the previous 5 years (Web Appendix A provides more details on the speci￿c
questions and survey sample for each country).
9The Indonesia and Philippines surveys also includes payments towards religious places. All results remain very
similar if we exclude those who only made these types of payments.
7Summary statistics for each survey are given in Table 2. The summary statistics (as well as
per-capita GDP from the World Development Indicators) indicate the breadth of countries covered
by our data. For example, per-capita GDP in the surveyed countries ranges from a low of PP$774
in Zambia to a high of PP$6129 in Panama, and mean years of education for the household head
ranges from a low of 2.5 in Ethiopia to a high of 9.6 in Albania.
We include survey data from all available countries in our empirical analysis in order to paint as
complete a picture as possible of the informal taxation phenomenon. One caveat, however, is worth
noting explicitly. To the best of our knowledge, public labor contributions are legally mandated
in Vietnam. If an individual cannot ful￿ll his required contribution, he must ￿nd a replacement
worker or make a monetary payment equivalent to hiring a replacement at local labor costs.10 The
payments observed in Vietnam may therefore be a formal tax rather than an informal tax.
4 Stylized Facts and Implications
This section presents several stylized facts about informal taxation. We focus on the following
questions that are relevant when thinking about any tax: where is it most prevalent? how large
is it? who pays it? and how is it collected? The ￿rst subsection summarizes the prevalence and
magnitude of informal taxation and compares the magnitude of informal taxation to formal tax
payments made by households and to formal government expenditure. In the second subsection,
we examine the distributional implications of informal tax payments and discuss the progressivity
of informal taxation relative to formal taxation. The third subsection discusses how these taxes are
collected and explores a feature of informal taxation that sharply distinguishes it from conventional
taxation: payments are often in labor rather than money. The ￿nal subsection provides a brief
discussion of the implications of these ￿ndings for public ￿nance in developing countries.
10Speci￿cally, as of the year 2000, each citizen (men 18-45 yrs old, women 18-35) is required to participate in public
service work, for 10 days per year. If one cannot participate, the individual needs to ￿nd some replacement worker
or submit a ￿nancial contribution either to the commune/ward people￿ s committee or to the individual￿ s employing
institution/enterprise. This payment is once per year (per individual), and the required amount is set equivalent to
the hiring of replacements at local labor costs. The law speci￿es di⁄erent degrees of formal punishments depending
the type of violations: for example, avoidance for the ￿rst time gets a warning and ￿ne. We thank Trang Nguyen
for providing this information. The features of the system may result in over-reporting if individuals do not believe
their responses will be con￿dential.
84.1 Prevalence and Magnitude of Informal Taxation
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics on prevalence and magnitude
We begin by presenting descriptive statistics to examine the most basic question about informal
taxation: prevalence. Table 3 presents three sets of descriptive statistics: the share of households
making informal taxation payments over the recall period (Panel A), the share of households making
in-kind labor payments vs. payments in money and materials (Panel B), and the average amounts
of those payments (Panel C) for each country in our sample.11
Informal taxation is prevalent in all surveyed countries (Panel A). With the exception of Albania,
participation rates are 20% or higher in all countries and exceed 50% in Ethiopia, Indonesia, and
Vietnam. Informal taxation is more prevalent in rural areas in every country in our sample for
which we have data on both. Across the sample, participation rates are between 27% (Vietnam)
and 183% (Guatemala) higher in rural areas than in urban areas.
In-kind payments in the form of labor are common in all countries (Panel B). The share of
households paying in labor is higher than the share of households paying in money in 3 of the 5
countries for which we have data on both labor and monetary payments (Indonesia, Nicaragua,
and Zambia). In the other two countries (Panama and Vietnam), labor payments are still quite
common, with 19 and 24 percent of households making payments in labor, respectively. The gap
between urban and rural is smaller for monetary payments than for labor payments in all cases.
Panel C shows the magnitude of informal tax payments for all countries for which quantity data
are available. The ￿gures shown represent annualized labor payments (in days) and annualized
monetary payments (in 2000 PPP US dollars). Average labor payments vary from 0.2 days per
year in Albania to 14.1 days per year in Ethiopia.
11As noted above, the recall period di⁄ers across surveys. We report annualized amounts for quantities but do not
adjust the participation data. To facilitate interpretation, the surveys in this and subsequent tables are sorted by
survey recall period. For surveys in which respondents were asked only about labor payments, the listed participation
rates for "overall participation" can be thought of as lower bounds on true participation rates.
94.1.2 Informal taxes and formal taxes paid by households
To better gauge the magnitude of informal taxation, we compare it to two types of benchmarks.
In this subsection, we examine the burden it imposes on households by comparing informal tax
payments to household expenditure and to total taxes paid by households. These benchmarks
are available for the same households for whom we have data on informal taxation payments,
ensuring consistent samples for comparison. In the next subsection, we compare informal taxation
to government budgets.
In order to make these comparisons, we monetize the labor payments made by households to
construct a measure of total informal tax payments. To do so, for each country we predict the
wage for all working household members based on their education, age, gender, and urban/rural
status, and value the labor contributions at the average predicted wage for all working household
members. We use the predicted daily wage rate, rather than the household daily wage rate, so that
when we regress payments on household expenditures below, we will not be using expenditures on
both the left hand and right hand sides of the same regression.12 This method values the marginal
and average wage of the household equally. This assumption is consistent with Dwayne Benjamin
(1992) who shows that household composition does not a⁄ect own-farm labor supply for agricultural
households in Indonesia, suggesting that labor markets for these households are competitive and
complete. Using predicted wages measures the magnitude of informal taxation as the social cost
of production, which may di⁄er from the value of output produced if the opportunity cost di⁄ers
from the marginal product on the project.
It is important to note the implications of using the household￿ s predicted wage rate to monetize
days of contributions, rather than a measure of the "true" wage. First, taking the average predicted
wage across the household, rather than trying to estimate the wage for each individual, means that
if contributions are made by those with the lowest opportunity cost of time, our estimate of the
average household wage may be an overestimate. On the hand, it is possible that some people
who are listed as "working" in the household do not work a full 260 work days per year, which
would lead us to underestimate their true wage rate, or that those who contribute are prime-age
12Details of the wage prediction methodology are given in Appendix ??.
10males with a higher marginal product than the average in the household. Second, predicting the
household￿ s wage rate using demographics, rather than using total consumption divided by total
number of works, has the advantage of removing variation arising from unearned income or labor
supply, which would otherwise lead to an upward bias in the estimated wage; however, it also does
not take into account dimensions of skill not captured by the included demographics, which could
lead to a downward bias. The ideal thought experiment would be to measure the true marginal
wage for each household member at the time of year they contribute to informal taxes, though
this is not feasible in our data. As an alternative, we therefore discuss speci￿cations using labor
measured in days rather than monetized days below.
Income data from developing country household surveys is often unreliable, so we follow the
standard convention of using household expenditures as a proxy for household income throughout
the paper. Speci￿cally, we use an equivalence scale adjusted measure of household expenditure
to take into account children in the household and economies of scale. (Details provided in Web
Appendix A.) As an alternative, we have veri￿ed that all empirical results are qualitatively similar if
we use log total household expenditure and a set of household size dummies instead of log equivalent
expenditure.
Data on total tax payments comes from two sources. Direct formal taxes paid by households
are calculated as the sum of all direct tax payments observed in the data, and include items
such as land and buildings taxes and personal income taxes. Indirect formal taxes (VAT) are
imputed from consumption data and commodity speci￿c VAT and excise rates for each country.
We do not include expenditures on food in our VAT estimates, since most households in developing
countries are unlikely to pay VAT on most food consumption in practice; nevertheless, we may be
overestimating VAT if evasion on non-food items is prevalent. Total formal taxes are the sum of
direct and imputed indirect taxes. Further details on the calculation of direct and indirect taxes
are given in Web Appendix A.
Using this data, we calculate informal taxes as a share of total household expenditure and
informal taxes as a share of total household taxes (informal + direct formal + indirect formal).
Table 4 presents the mean of these variables for each country in the dataset. Since some households
11may live in areas where informal taxation does not occur, we present both results for all households
(rows 1 and 3) and for all households that have non-zero informal tax payments (rows 2 and 4).
Overall, informal taxation appears to comprise a small share of household expenditure, although
there is substantial heterogeneity across countries. Mean informal taxation payments range from
a low of 0.04% of household expenditure in Albania to a high of 3.8% in Ethiopia. Conditional on
making any informal tax payments, shares range from 0.37% (Albania) to 6.8% (Ethiopia).
Informal taxes are a moderate share of total taxes paid by households: mean shares are 0.5%
in Albania, 7% in the Philippines, 16% in Vietnam, 17% in Indonesia, and 27% in Ethiopia. As
a share of total tax payments, informal taxes are of the same order of magnitude as subnational
taxes in developed countries: in 2001, the OECD average of subnational revenue as a share of total
revenue was 21.9% (Isabelle Journard and Per Marhis Kongsrud 2003).
4.1.3 Informal taxes and formal government expenditure
To understand how important informal taxation is to local public ￿nance, we compare informal
taxation to government budgets. We focus on Indonesia, where for the 2007 budget year we have
data on both district expenditures and village expenditures for the districts and villages in our
survey area.13 We convert all amounts to 2000 PPP dollars, and express them in per-household
terms. We calculate the mean per-household level of informal taxes and formal taxes from the
household survey, as well as the mean per-household level of village and district revenues and
village and district expenditures for our sample area; results are given in Table 5.14
We ￿nd that informal taxes are large relative to village budgets. Average annual per house-
hold village budgets are 117.64 dollars per year, whereas our household survey suggests that per
household informal taxes are 49.86 dollars per year. The o¢ cial village budget includes payments
in-kind, suggesting that at least some informal taxation is already included in the village budget.
The magnitudes demonstrate that informal taxation is one of the primary ways through which local
13District budgets come from the Ministry of Finance￿ s Directorate of Fiscal Balancing. Village budgets come from
the 2008 PODES (Census of Villages), which reports on the 2007 ￿scal year.
14Note that the village budgets were available for 19 of the 20 districts in our household survey area. We have
therefore calculated all statistics in Table 5 on the same set of 19 districts to ensure maximum comparability. Note
also that the household survey sample only includes subdistricts that are no more than 70% urban, so it potentially
excludes the very urban central areas of a few districts.
12public goods are ￿nanced by these villages.
We next compare informal taxation to district budgets. Since Indonesia￿ s decentralization
began in 2001, Indonesian districts have primary responsibility for virtually all local public goods,
including local infrastructure, water, health, and education. The budget is divided into expenditures
on salaries, goods and services, and capital expenditures.15 These district budgets also include the
intergovernmental transfers to villages, so these budgets should be viewed as a superset of the
village budgets. Informal taxation payments are 4.4% as large as total district budgets, and 12.6%
as large as district spending on capital expenditures. This implies that a non-trivial share of all
spending on local public goods occurs through the informal taxation mechanism.
Third, we compare informal taxes with the other taxes that are under the control of local
government: formal taxes and fees collected by the village and district governments. Table 5 shows
that, other than informal taxation, sources of formal tax revenue under direct control of local
governments are limited, as most revenue comes from intergovernmental grants from the national
government (which administers the VAT and other taxes). Informal taxes are 1.5 times larger than
total village taxes (which likely include at least some "on the books" informal taxation) and 1.15
times as large as total district level formal taxes and fees. Informal taxes are therefore the largest
source of ￿nance that is under local control.
The above ￿gures present estimates of informal taxes in which labor payments are monetized
as described in the previous section. We have also constructed estimates of informal taxes in which
labor payments are monetized using the local unskilled wage rate.16 The resulting estimates of per
household informal taxes decline only slightly, from 49.86 to 44.30 dollars per year. This adjustment
does not substantively a⁄ect any of our conclusions about the importance of informal taxes as a
local revenue source.
15Note that the sum of the expenditure categories does not exactly equal the total, as there are a few misc.
categories that are not included. Note also that informal taxation payments are not reported in district budgets, so
double-counting is not an issue in this comparison.
16The local unskilled wage rate is calculated using survey information provided by the village head. We sum the
daily wage of a male laborer in the month of the interview in the village/ward with the average value per day of
goods provided for consumption while working (if applicable). We then divided by the number of hours worked by
laborers on an average day and multiplied by 6 to get the value of labor for a "normal" work day at the village level.
134.2 Distributional Implications of Informal Taxation
This section examines the distributional implications of informal taxation by looking at the rela-
tionship between informal taxation payments and household expenditure. We begin by examining
the distribution of informal taxation payments within communities, which tells us how the bur-
den for ￿nancing a given level of public goods is borne across high and low income individuals
in those communities. Since informal taxation payments are determined at the community level,
this within-community analysis is the level of analysis one needs for developing models of informal
taxation. We then compare the aggregate burden of informal and formal taxation across the income
distribution.
4.2.1 Informal taxation within communities
We ￿rst examine the participation margin ￿i.e., which households make informal taxation pay-
ments. Since we are interested in looking within communities, we estimate a ￿xed-e⁄ects logit
model of the form
P(PAYhc = 1) =
exp[￿c + ￿LN (EQUIV EXPhc)]
1 + exp[￿c + ￿LN (EQUIV EXPhc)]
(1)
where c is a community, h is a household, ￿c is a community ￿xed e⁄ect, and PAYhc is a dummy
for whether household h in community c made any payments.17 The key coe¢ cient is ￿, which is
the log odds-ratio of the probability of making payments with respect to log equivalent household
expenditure. Given the incidental parameters problem, we estimate (1) as a conditional logit
model, which conditions out the ￿c in estimation. Robust standard errors in this and subsequent
regressions are adjusted for clustering at the community level.
The results are presented in Panel A of Table 6. Each cell in the table reports the coe¢ cient on
log equivalent household expenditure (￿) from a separate regression of the form in equation (1).18
The estimated overall participation-expenditure gradient is statistically signi￿cantly positive in 6 of
17Note that for the Philippines, Albania, Ethopia, Guatemala, and Nigeria, the PAY variable refers to in-kind
labor payments only. For all other countries, the PAY variable captures both monetary and in-kind payments.
18As discussed above, we obtain similar results in this and subsequent speci￿cations if we regress contributions on
log household expenditure and add as controls dummies for household size (not shown).
14the 10 countries in our sample and is never negative and statistically signi￿cant. The median log-
odds ratio among all 10 countries in the sample is 0.19. This demonstrates that the probability of
payment is increasing with household expenditure within communities, and this pattern is generally
consistent throughout the the countries in our sample.
We next examine the relationship between the quantity of payments and expenditure for coun-
tries for which data on the quantity of payments are available. Given the large number of obser-
vations with no payments, as well as the large number of ￿xed e⁄ects we wish to condition out,
we estimate this relationship as a ￿xed-e⁄ects Poisson quasi-MLE regression with robust standard
errors (Jerry A. Hausman, Bronwyn H. Hall, and Zvi Griliches 1984; Je⁄rey M. Wooldridge 1999;
see also Wooldridge 2002). This estimates, by MLE, equations such that
E(PAY MENTAMOUNThc) = ￿c exp(￿LN (EQUIV EXP)hc) (2)
where ￿c is a community ￿xed-e⁄ect, and PAY MENTMOUNT is the quantity of total payments
(in local currency). Given the Poisson QMLE speci￿cation, the resulting coe¢ cients ￿ can be
interpreted as elasticities.
To calculate PAY MENTAMOUNT, we monetize labor payments using the imputed average
household wage as described above.19 By allowing the wage to vary with household income, we
incorporate the fact that providing a day of labor is more costly for those with high opportunity
cost.
The results (Table 6, Panel B) show that total payments are increasing in expenditure in all
countries for which we have quantity data, and the coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant in all cases.
The estimated elasticities of informal taxation payments with respect to equivalent expenditure are
0.40 in the Philippines, 0.33 in Albania, 0.13 in Ethiopia, 0.39 in Indonesia, and 0.08 in Vietnam.
These elasticities are also strictly and statistically signi￿cantly less than 1, indicating that while
19As an alternative, we have considered a speci￿cation in which we examine days, rather than monetizing by the
wage rate (results not reported). As one would expect, the coe¢ cients examining just days are generally smaller than
in the monetized days speci￿cation, although the gradient remains positive and signi￿cant in Albania and Indonesia
and positive and insigni￿cant in the Philippines and Ethiopia. The coe¢ cient for Vietnam is negative and signi￿cant,
which may re￿ ect features of the mandatory labor payment system.
15payments increase with expenditure, the share of household expenditures devoted to informal tax
payments (i.e., the average tax rate) is declining with expenditure.20 Payments are also increasing
in expenditure even conditional on making a positive informal tax payment (Table 6, Panel C), so
the overall e⁄ects are driven by the intensive margin as well as the extensive margin.21
One might be concerned that measurement error in household expenditure data could cause the
estimates to be less than one even if informal taxation is truly progressive. However, applying the
classical measurement error attenuation bias formula to our estimates shows that measurement error
would have to account for more than 60% of the total variation in observed household expenditures
in all countries in order for this to be the case. Moreover, as we show below, we estimate that
formal taxes are indeed progressive (with an elasticity > 1). Measurement error, if present, also
should not a⁄ect our overall conclusions about the relative progressivity of informal and formal
taxation, discussed in the next subsection.
Together, the results tell a consistent story: within communities, the wealthy pay more in
informal taxes than the poor on an absolute level, though they pay less as a share of their total
resources.
4.2.2 Comparing formal and informal taxation
We next compare informal taxes to formal direct and indirect tax payments by households. The
results are presented in Table 7. For comparison purposes, Panel A shows the relationship between
informal taxes and equivalent household expenditures with community ￿xed e⁄ects and Panel B
repeats the same regressions for direct formal taxes.
The results in Table 7 show that in all countries we examine, the estimated elasticities of formal
taxes with respect to household expenditure are greater than the estimated elasticities for informal
20Note that monetizing labor payments at a common rate, rather than at the predicted household wage rate as we
do, would make informal taxation appear even more regressive.
21As a robustness check for the results in Panel B, we have run OLS regressions of log (total payments + 1) on
the log of equivalent expenditure with community ￿xed e⁄ects. This provides a simple way of dealing with the mass
at zero contributions in an OLS model while retaining a proportional structure to the model. The OLS coe¢ cients
are also all between zero and one, and are broadly similar to the Poisson estimates (although the coe¢ cients for the
Philippines and Ethiopia are no longer statistically signi￿cant). The results in Panel C are also extremely similar
if we instead run OLS regressions of log payments on equivalent expenditure with community ￿xed e⁄ects. These
results are available on request.
16taxes. For example, the elasticity of formal direct taxes with respect to household consumption
is 1.526 in the Philippines, 1.433 in Albania, and 1.372 in Indonesia, so that formal direct taxes
are progressive in these countries. By comparison, the analogous elasticity for informal taxes is
0.395 in the Philippines, 0.334 in Albania, and 0.387 in Indonesia, so informal taxes are on average
regressive. Note that we use the terms progressive and regressive in reference to the distributional
implications of the tax schedules. If informal and formal taxation fund di⁄erent types of public
goods, the distributional consequences of the full tax and expenditure system could di⁄er. However,
the di⁄erence in progressivity on the revenue side is substantial.
The same overall conclusions hold if we examine income gradients without community ￿xed
e⁄ects (Table 7, Panels C and D): The gradients on informal tax payments are between 0 and 1
(with the exception of Vietnam), and the gradients on formal direct tax payments are greater than
1 (with the exceptions of Ethiopia and Vietnam). For all countries, formal direct tax payments are
more progressive than informal tax payments.
Figure 1 illustrates these di⁄erences graphically, plotting informal taxes, direct formal taxes
and total formal taxes (i.e., direct + indirect), all expressed as percentages of total household
expenditure. In this graph, a proportional relationship (equivalent to a coe¢ cient of 1 in the table)
would would correspond to a horizontal line, so a positive slope indicates progressivity (coe¢ cient
> 1 in the table) and a negative slope indicate regressivity (coe¢ cient < 1 in the table). For each
country, we plot the results of a non-parametric Fan regression (Jianqing Fan 1992) of each variable
against log equivalent household expenditure. These regressions do not include community ￿xed
e⁄ects, so they are most comparable to Panels C and D of Table 7. The solid lines in Figure 1
show informal taxes, the dashed lines shows direct formal taxes, and the dotted line shows total
formal taxes. For comparison, we also plot a histogram of log equivalent household expenditure.
To keep the graphs readable, we have excluded the bottom 0.5% and top 0.5% of the household
expenditure distribution. The most striking fact about these graphs is that the formal tax system
is progressive in most countries whereas the informal tax system is regressive. Including informal
taxation therefore makes the total tax burden look more regressive than previously thought, both
looking within communities and at the national level.
174.3 Monetary vs. In-Kind Payments
A notable feature of informal taxation is that payments are often made in labor rather than money
(Table 3). To better understand this phenomenon, it is useful to understand in more detail which
types of households pay in labor versus money.
To do so, we re-estimate equations (1) and (2) separately for each type of payment, focusing
on the countries for which we have data on both monetary and in-kind labor payments. In the
quantity analysis, to be consistent with the previous tables, we continue to value labor payments
at the household￿ s predicted average wage rate. Using days instead of monetized labor payments
generally makes the reported estimates for labor smaller and accentuates the di⁄erence between
labor and money more than shown in the tables here.
The results for the participation margin ￿does the household pay any labor or any money ￿
are presented in Panel A of Table 8, and the results on the quantity paid are presented in Panel
B of Table 8. The results in both panels show a very clear pattern: for almost all countries in the
sample, monetary payments increase more quickly with overall household expenditure than in-kind
labor payments. This is true both on the participation margin and, for the two countries where
we have quantity data, on the quantity margin as well. For example, looking within communities
in Indonesia, the elasticity of labor payments with respect to household expenditure is 0.26, but
the elasticity of monetary payments with respect to household expenditure is 1.45 (see Panel B of
Table 8). This implies that monetary contributions are particularly concentrated at higher income
levels.
4.4 Implications
These stylized facts have several implications for public ￿nance in developing countries. First,
a substantial share of households in many developing countries participate in these mechanisms.
The results from Indonesia suggest that informal taxation can, at least in some cases, be the
largest source of revenue for local communities and may be a non-trivial component of national
spending on public capital improvements. Failing to take informal taxation into account will lead
to underestimates of the tax burden faced by households, the size of the public sector, and the level
18of decentralization. Second, informal taxation is redistributive but regressive, and this pattern
is observed in almost all of our sample countries. Formal taxes appear to be more progressive
than informal taxes, so estimates of formal taxes alone may result in overestimates of the overall
progressivity of the tax system. Finally, a notable feature of informal taxation is that in-kind labor
payments are an important source of ￿nance and are made even by households with relatively high
household expenditure.
These ￿ndings also raise a number of questions. Why would communities choose such mecha-
nisms of ￿nance, and why do they tend to be concentrated in developing countries and poor and
rural areas? What determines the distribution of payments across individuals within a community,
and why do wealthier households pay more than poorer households? Why are in-kind payments
so prevalent in informal tax systems when they are rarely seen as part of modern formal tax sys-
tems and why labor payments arise in equilibrium. In the next section, we discuss several possible
explanations for the patterns observed in the data.
5 Explaining the Stylized Facts
There are a number of (non-mutually exclusive) possible explanations for the observed stylized facts.
This section outlines four potential such explanations: informal taxes as a response to explicit legal
constraints on formal taxes, informal taxes as an optimal response to information and enforcement
problems, informal taxes as user fees, and informal taxation as altruistic voluntary contributions.
5.1 Informal taxation as a response to legal constraints on formal taxes
A ￿rst possibility is that informal taxation is simply a response to constraints on the ability of local
governments to raise formal taxes to meet their demand for local public goods. Local governments
may be legally prohibited by the center from levying certain types of taxes, or capacity problems
may prevent them from being able to set up e⁄ective systems of formal taxation. If their demand
for public goods exceeds intergovernmental transfers, informal taxation may be the only mechanism
through which additional public goods can be ￿nanced.
19This story is consistent with observed instances of informal taxation in the United States, which
appear to arise when there are explicit constraints on local ability to raise revenue. When Ver-
mont￿ s school ￿nance redistribution law made ￿nancing schools through higher local taxes more
expensive, for example, some communities responded by explicitly pressuring households and busi-
nesses to make "voluntary" contributions to schools.22 School fund leaders in Manchester, VT,
for example, published lists of compliers and encouraged residents to call or visit non-contributer
neighbors.23 Residents described a variety of sanctions levied on non-contributers, ranging from
speci￿c punishments ("if there is a restaurant that didn￿ t pay, I know that I￿ m not going to eat
there") to more intangible social sanctions ("it￿ s hard to look at those people in the same way").
Similar extragovernmental mechanisms were observed in California when Proposition 13 limited
local property taxes (Eric Brunner and Jon Sonstelie 2003). Labor and money contributions to ￿re
departments, libraries, and recreational services have also been shown to increase in response to
￿scal limitations (e.g., James M. Ferris 1984; Douglas C. Bice and William H. Hoyt 2000).
While limits on formal taxes may be important, further explanation is required to explain how
informal taxation is sustained or to make predictions about the distribution or form of informal
taxation. The remaining explanations suggest these types of testable implications, and help under-
stand now just how informal taxation occurs when it is the only choice, but also suggest when it
might be optimal even if formal taxes are feasible.
5.2 Informal taxation as an optimal response to information and enforcement
constraints
A second possibility is that informal taxation could in fact arise as the solution to a constrained
optimal tax problem. In this framework, outlined in detail in Web Appendix B, local governments
wish to ￿nance public goods in a social welfare maximizing way and are making a choice between
formal and informal taxation. Communities face an enforcement constraint (punishments for non-
compliance may be limited) and a hidden income constraint (high ability types can pretend to be low
22Winerip, Michael. "On Education; Giving Green or Turning Red." The New York Times, February 26, 2003.
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/26/nyregion/on-education-giving-green-or-turning-red.html
23Tomsho, Robert. "Fund-Raising Drive for Schools Leaves Vermont Town Disunited." Wall Street Journal, Feb-
ruary 6, 2001. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB981415618347518787.html
20ability types). We model formal and informal taxation as having di⁄erent constraint parameters,
arising from di⁄erences in their tax technologies. In the informal system, enforcement happens
through social sanctions rather than through courts. This means that the informal tax system
can use information that is observable but not legally veri￿able, so informal taxation mechanisms
e⁄ectively have better information on earnings ability than the formal tax system. On the other
hand, by foregoing formal legal proceedings, the informal system must use less severe punishments
￿i.e., social sanctions instead of jail time ￿which limits the progressivity of the informal taxation
system. The choice between formal and informal taxes therefore represents a trade-o⁄ between
enforcement and information.
As we show formally in Web Appendix B, informal taxes are likely to be preferred to formal taxes
if evasion costs are low or if the community can e⁄ectively levy social sanctions. The prevalence
of informal taxation throughout our sample of developing countries, particularly in rural areas,
is consistent with the existing evidence that informal insurance and credit markets may function
more e⁄ectively in rural areas, where information is better and villagers are better able to levy
informal sanctions for default (Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate 1995; Townsend 1995; Abhijit
Banerjee and Andrew Newman 1998; Maitreesh Ghatak 1999) and with existing evidence that
local communities have more information about actual income levels than the central government
(Harold Alderman 2002; Vivi Alatas et al. 2010). The ability to verify income legally may also
be more di¢ cult in developing countries, since many individuals work in or can easily shift into
the informal sector. Unsurprisingly, informal taxation mechanisms are not generally observed in
developed countries, where it is harder to hide income and where social sanctions may be less
e⁄ective.
This framework rationalizes the observed positive participation and payment gradients: depend-
ing on the distribution of abilities, it may be optimal for the lowest ability types not to participate,
and payments should increase with earnings ability. The framework also reconciles the use of in-
kind labor payments. In the presence of asymmetric information, labor payments can be used as a
screening device, since unobservably high ability types face a higher cost of in-kind labor payments
21relative to monetary payments.24 While use of labor as a screening device has been considered in
the design of income maintenance programs (e.g., Besley and Coate 1992), it has not, to the best
of our knowledge, been considered in the context of raising revenue. While it may be optimal for
individuals to make payments in labor even if their opportunity cost of time exceeds their marginal
value on the project, the highest ability type will always pay in money: the equivalent of the "no
distortion at the top" result from the optimal tax literature (James A. Mirrlees 1971).
This story implies that communities may choose to make use of informal taxation as a ￿nancing
mechanism either when there are exogenous constraints on formal taxation, or when formal taxa-
tion is possible, but the information advantages of informal taxation allow a system that is more
progressive than would be possible under formal taxation.
5.3 Informal taxation as user fees
A third hypothesis is that these payments represent pre-paid user fees or bene￿ts taxes. A pure
user fee model would not necessarily generate a positive correlation between household expenditure
and payments unless demand for the goods was correlated with household income. If payments
represent bene￿ts taxes, then it is possible that payments could be correlated with income; under
Lindahl pricing, for example, each household should pay for the public good according to their
marginal bene￿t (in utility terms).
To examine these hypotheses, we look at whether households are more likely to pay for goods
for which they bene￿t and whether this could explain the observed positive participation gradient
of informal tax payments. We focus on the two types of goods for which we can clearly separate
users from non-users: we examine whether households who have their own private well are less
likely to contribute to water projects, and whether those with school-age children are more likely
to contribute to schools.25
24In theory, the screening bene￿ts of using labor taxes extends to formal tax systems as well. However, monitoring
in-kind payments may be challenging. If the ability to monitor labor payments informally is greater than the ability
to monitor formally (up to the standard of evidence required by the legal system), we would expect labor tax payments
to be more common in informal tax systems than in formal tax systems. The model in Web Appendix B introduces
a shirking constraint (those supposed to be working on public projects can shirk) to formalize this intuition.
25Note that the within-community sample sizes are not large enough for us to construct meaningful overlapping
samples. Therefore, the results for project type should be interpreted as illustrating the distribution of payments
for the sample of communities for which the share of households making payments to that project type are strictly
22For countries for which we have disaggregated data on project type, we do see some mixed
evidence of user fees: in some countries, those who are likely to need public water are more likely
to pay for water projects and those with children are more likely to pay for schools (Table 9).26
However, with the exception of Zambia, we do not observe a positive expenditure gradient on
participation for schools or water projects, even in regressions where we do not control for having
children or not having access to private water. This suggests that while these goods may be ￿nanced
partially through user fees, these goods are not explaining the overall positive correlation we found
above between participation rates and household expenditure. The evidence also does not support
a Lindahl pricing mechanism for water and schools, unless demand for these goods is inversely
correlated with income, which seems unlikely.
5.4 Informal taxation as altruistic voluntary contributions
Finally, it is possible that these payments are more akin to voluntary charitable contributions than
taxes. The range of models of charitable contributions is vast, but it is di¢ cult to reconcile the
evidence with a charitable contributions story alone. For example, many of the studies discussed
in Section 2 speci￿cally describe the punishments that are imposed on those who do not meet their
expected obligations, suggesting that payments are unlikely to be motivated solely by altruism or
warm glow preferences (e.g., James Andreoni 1990).
To investigate more systematically the process through which informal tax payments are de-
termined and enforced, we asked both households and village heads in the Indonesia survey to
describe who makes decisions regarding household payments and what the consequences are for
households who do not participate. The ￿rst question we asked was who makes decisions about
which households participate in such mechanisms (Table 10). Although respondents were allowed
to give multiple responses, only 8% of individual respondents and village heads reported that house-
holds make these decisions for themselves; 81% of households report that decisions are made by
between zero and one.
26It is di¢ cult to interpret the coe¢ cient on children in the household since we also include equivalent scale
expenditure. We use this speci￿cation because we are primarily interested in the di⁄erence in the relationship
between payment and having children in the household across the school and water regressions rather in the level of
the coe¢ cient.
23neighborhood, hamlet, or village heads. We observe a similar pattern when respondents are asked
who makes decisions about how much each household is expected to pay: only 20% of households
and 15% of village heads report that households make these decisions for themselves. These consis-
tent responses from individual households and from village heads suggest that the these payments
are not decided unilaterally by households, but are rather part of a system determined at the
community level.
We then ask respondents about the consequences for not making the determined level of pay-
ment. A substantial number of respondents indicated that they would be expected to make up the
contribution in another way, either by payment at a di⁄erent time or in a di⁄erent form. Most
strikingly, 17% of individual respondents and 22% of village heads indicated that non-participating
households would be expected to pay a ￿ne. Interestingly, we ￿nd that the probability that a
household reports a sanction for failure to pay is signi￿cantly higher for wealthier households; this
could be consistent with poorer households not reporting sanctions because they are not expected
to make payments (results not reported in the table). Conditional on some type of sanction being
levied, 47% of households stated that the sanction was determined by either the village head or at
a village meeting. Charitable contributions motives may be part of what is driving observed pay-
ments, but the facts that payment schedules are set by the leader or group, not by the individual,
and there are consequences imposed for non-payment suggest that there are other forces at play as
well.
Note that use of labor payments is not directly predicted by any of the above stories, with the
exception of the optimal constrained tax story discussed in Section 5.2 in which labor payments
serve as a screening device. The use of labor payments could also be a response to other types of
market failures. If local governments are corrupt, residents may prefer to make payments toward
public projects in a form that cannot be expropriated. Another possibility is failures in the labor
market, arising from incomplete markets or asymmetric information. If there is excess supply of
labor, the opportunity cost of supplying labor may be very low. Local residents may also be more
productive than outside hired workers, either because they have better information about how best
to implement the project in the local context or because they have less incentive to engage in moral
24hazard.
Another important point to note when comparing informal tax mechanisms and formal taxation
is that the two types of systems may fund di⁄erent types of public goods. Under the optimal
tax model, production may be limited by the ability of community residents since much of the
￿nancing is in the form of in-kind labor. In addition, the requirement that communities impose
social sanctions may mean that production is limited to goods for which activities are visible, such
as construction of public infrastructure. Alternatively, under the user fee model, these mechanisms
are only sustainable for goods that are excludable or for which use can be monitored and fees
enforced, and under a "warm glow" voluntary contributions model, the choice of public goods may
depend heavily on the preferences of those who are motivated to make such contributions.
6 Conclusion
Informal taxation systems appear to play an important role in local public ￿nance in developing
countries. We present some of the ￿rst systematic, cross-country evidence on the prevalence,
magnitude, distributional implications, and forms of informal taxation. We ￿nd that informal
taxation is prevalent, with 20% or more of households participating in informal taxation schemes
in all but one surveyed country, and more than 50% of households participating in several countries.
Informal taxes exceed formal direct tax payments by most households and can form a substantial
share of households￿total tax burdens. In Indonesia, where we can compare informal taxes to local
budgets, we ￿nd that informal taxation represents the largest source of public ￿nance under local
control and comprises a non-trivial share of all capital expenditures. In all of our sample countries,
in-kind payments in the form of labor appear to be an important component of these ￿nancing
systems, and informal taxation is redistributive but regressive.
Why do these systems arise, and why are they more common in developing countries? One
possibility is that they are simply a response to local ￿scal constraints: local communities are
unable to raise formal taxes to fund their preferred level of public goods, and informal taxation is
therefore the only ￿nancing mechanism available to them. While this constraint may be important,
25it does not fully explain the informal taxation phenomenon, since it suggests no direct predictions
about the form or distribution of payments. As we have seen, there are in fact systematic patterns
that appear to hold across countries. One possibility is that informal taxation re￿ ects the desire of
communities to impose more redistributive (socially enforced) tax schedules than are feasible under
formal taxation, by taking advantage of local information about income within the community that
is observable but not veri￿able. Informal taxation may also represent pre-paid user fees, particularly
for goods that are excludable. Finally, contributions may be purely voluntary, re￿ ecting "warm
glow" in the provision of public goods. In practice, a combination of these forces may be at work.
Regardless of the underlying mechanism(s) at work, our ￿ndings have a number of implica-
tions for thinking about public ￿nance in developing countries and for development policy. First,
a substantial share of households in many developing countries participate in extragovernmental
mechanisms for the ￿nance of local public goods. Policies such as the imposition of formal taxes,
paid public works programs, and intergovernmental grants may therefore a⁄ect households and
communities both directly as well as indirectly, through their e⁄ects on informal taxation mecha-
nisms. To the best of our knowledge, this type of crowd-out has not traditionally been considered
in the analysis of public programs in developing countries.
Second, to the extent that these payments are thought of as a tax, estimates of formal taxes
may understate the true tax burden faced by households. In particular, the conventional wisdom
that poor households and households in rural areas do not generally pay taxes other than VAT may
be misleading. The potential e¢ ciency costs of these taxes have not, to the best of our knowledge,
been considered.
Third, failing to take informal taxation into account will lead to underestimates of the size
of the public sector and the level of decentralization. In particular, informal taxation can be
the dominant source of revenue for local communities and may be a non-trivial component of
national spending on public capital improvements in developing countries. While there has been an
increasing push toward decentralization in developing countries, such reforms have generally led to
greater decentralization of expenditures than of revenue collection (Pranab Bardhan 2002). Since
informal taxes are collected at the community level, these ￿ndings indicate that a larger share of
26local public goods is ￿nanced locally than the formal budget ￿gures would suggest. In addition,
informal taxation generally pays for particular types of goods, so formal tax ￿gures will distort
estimates of the mix as well as the level of government expenditures.
Finally, formal taxes appear to be more progressive than informal taxes, so failing to take
informal taxation into account will result in overestimates of the overall progressivity of the tax
system. The ￿ndings also suggest that a marginal expansion of the formal tax system through
expansion of the VAT, used to allow communities to reduce informal taxes, could substantially
increase the overall progressivity of the tax system. However, it is important to keep in mind that
most of these formal taxes are not raised by the local community, and determining the appropriate
community-speci￿c intergovernmental transfers is challenging. This is a primary reason why local
public goods in developed countries are often ￿nanced through local taxation.
The ￿ndings also have important implications for development policy. Many government pro-
grams, such as community-driven development programs championed by the World Bank and oth-
ers, encourage local co-￿nancing of public goods. Given that ￿nancing through informal taxation
is more regressive than ￿nancing through the overall tax system, there would need to be other
bene￿ts of local co-￿nancing to make this co-￿nancing optimal. For example, requiring local co-
￿nancing might help reveal information about the local willingness to pay for local public goods, or
it could improve project sustainability by encouraging ongoing maintenance of local public goods.
Alternatively, as discussed above, it is possible that additional central ￿nancing of public goods
might crowd out these types of locally-￿nanced public goods, altering both the level and type of
public goods provided. There could also be other consequences of formal versus informal ￿nancing
on community institutions and social networks. Understanding how central government policies
interact with informal taxation is an important direction for future research.
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Figure 1: Comparison of formal and informal taxes as a share of expenditure (without community fixed effects) 
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Notes: Tax variables are plotted as non-parametric Fan regressions of each variable against log equivalent household expenditure. The y-axis shows tax payments as a share of 
expenditure; a negative line therefore corresponds to regressivity.  These regressions do not include community fixed effects. For comparison, we also plot a histogram of log 
equivalent household expenditure. To keep the graphs readable, we exclude the bottom 0.5% and top 0.5% of the household expenditure distribution.  
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Table 1: Data sources 
Labor  Money 
   Database Name  Year Sample 
Sample size 
(number of 
households)
Recall 
period 
Payment 
indicator Quantity   
Payment 
indicator Quantity 
Albania  Living standards measurement survey  2005  Nationally representative  3,840  1 year  X X     
Ethiopia  Ethiopian rural household survey  1997  Only rural areas  1,482  1 year  X X     
Guatemala National survey of living conditions  2000  Nationally representative  7,276  1 year  X      
Indonesia  Health and education service survey  2007  Only rural areas, focus on poorer areas  11,676  1 year  X X  X X 
Nicaragua  Living standards measurement study survey 1998  Nationally representative  4,209  5 years  X    X   
Nigeria  Nigeria living standards survey  2004  Nationally representative  19,159  1 year  X       
Panama  Living standards survey  2003  Nationally representative  6,363  1 year  X    X   
Philippines Living condition Survey  2003  Only rural areas, focus on poorer areas  2,398  6 months  X  X     
Vietnam  Household living standards survey  2002  Nationally representative  29,426  1 year  X  X  X  X 
Zambia  Living condition monitoring survey  1998  Nationally representative  16,788  5 years  X       X    
Notes: For more details on each of the surveys, please see Appendix A.. 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
 Albania  Ethiopia  Guatemala Indonesia  Nicaragua Nigeria  Panama  Philippines Vietnam  Zambia 
Household size  4.4 7.3 5.2 3.8 5.5 4.8 4.0 5.1 4.4 5.4 
Number of workers per household  1.6 1.6 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.9 2.5 1.9 
Expenditure per capita (in PPP $)  3396 554 2338  1112  2850 489 3514 938 1368 744 
GDP per capita (in 2000 PPP$)  4731  814  4048 3423 2910  941  6129 4250 2274  774 
% urban  47 0 43 0 57  45  64 0 24  36 
Age  (Household  head)  52 47 44 47 45 48 48 47 48 41 
Years  of  education  (Household  head)  9.6 2.5 4.1 6.5 4.3 5.1 8.3 5.7 7.0 6.6 
Notes: Each cell presents the mean of the variable in the row in the dataset listed in the column weighted using household weights (available for all countries 
except Ethiopia). When GDP is not available for the survey year, we used the most recent data. 
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Table 3: Summary of informal tax payments 
        
Philippines Albania Ethiopia Guatemala Indonesia Panama    Nigeria Vietnam Nicaragua Zambia 
 
Recall 
Period     6 months  1 year  1 year  1 year  1 year  1 year  1 year  1 year  5 years  5 years 
                     
All 0.33  0.09  0.51  0.37  0.76  0.32  0.26  0.59  0.20  0.23 
Rural 0.33  0.12  0.51  0.51  0.76 0.48  0.32  0.62 0.26 0.27  Panel A  Any 
payment 
Urban    0.07    0.18    0.24 0.20 0.49  0.16  0.15 
                                    
All 0.33  0.09  0.51  0.37  0.76  0.19  0.26  0.24  0.15  0.18 
Rural 0.33  0.12  0.51  0.51  0.76 0.34  0.32  0.28 0.22 0.23 
Any 
labor 
payment  Urban    0.07    0.18    0.11 0.20 0.13  0.09  0.08 
                     
All         0.28 0.22    0.50 0.07  0.08 
Rural         0.28 0.30    0.51 0.07  0.07 
Any 
money 
payment  Urban         0.18    0.45 0.08  0.09 
                     
All         0.27 0.09    0.15 0.02  0.03 
Rural         0.27 0.16    0.16  0.03 0.04 
Panel B 
Both 
money 
and labor 
payments  Urban               0.06    0.09  0.02  0.02 
Notes:  Each cell presents the mean of the variable listed in the row in the dataset listed in the column weighted using household weights (available 
for all countries except Ethiopia). The unit of observation is the household.  Some surveys only contained information about labor payments; for 
these surveys, participation rates given in Panel A will be identical to participation rates for “any labor payment” given in Panel B.  
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Table 3: Summary of informal tax payments (continued) 
        Philippines Albania Ethiopia Guatemala Indonesia Panama    Nigeria Vietnam Nicaragua Zambia 
1.1   0.2   14.1      5.7         3.1        
All 
(4.2) (0.6)  (28.3)    (13.2)     (7.3)    
1.1   0.2   14.1     5.7      3.5     
Rural 
(4.2) (0.6)  (28.3)    (13.2)     (7.7)    
  0.1            1.6     
Amount of 
labor 
payment 
(in days) 
Urban 
  (0.6)           (5.6)    
                      
3.3   1.8   27.6     7.5      12.8     
All 
(6.8) (1.2)  (34.6)    (14.7)     (9.8)    
3.3   1.6   27.6     7.5      12.8     
Rural 
(6.8) (1.0)  (34.6)    (14.7)     (9.7)    
  2.1            12.9     
Conditional 
amount of 
labor 
payment 
(in days) 
Urban 
  (1.3)          (10.1)    
                      
       8.9      13.5     
All 
       (167.4)     (19.8)    
       8.9      13.2     
Rural 
       (167.4)     (18.4)    
            14.5     
Amount of 
money 
payment 
(in 2000 
PPP US$) 
Urban 
            (23.6)    
                      
       32.5      27.2     
All 
       (318.2)     (20.4)    
       32.5      25.8     
Rural 
       (318.2)     (18.3)    
            31.9     
Panel 
C 
Conditional 
amount of 
money 
payment 
(in 2000 
PPP US$)  Urban 
                     (25.8)       
Notes: The figures in Panel C represent annualized quantities; numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations.  For reference in interpreting the 
monetary amounts in Panel C, the average annual per capita expenditure in these samples (in PPP$) is 1112 for Indonesia and 1368 for Vietnam.  
Conditional amounts reported are conditional on making any payment.  Weighted using household weights (available for all countries except 
Ethiopia).  
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Table 4: Informal Taxation, Expenditure, and Formal Taxation 
     
Philippines Albania Ethiopia Indonesia    Vietnam 
Informal tax as a share of HH expenditure 
All households  0.23%  0.04%  3.77%  1.43%  0.85% 
Conditional on informal tax > 0  0.66% 0.37%  6.81% 1.83% 1.41% 
 
Informal tax as a share of HH Total Formal + Informal Tax payments 
All households  6.94%  0.48%  26.8%  16.56%  15.70% 
Conditional on informal tax > 0  20.36% 4.57%  49.22%  21.15%  26.07% 
Notes: The included countries are the countries for which we have quantity data on informal tax payments. 
Please see Appendix A for details on the formal tax payment calculations.  Weighted using household weights  
(available for all countries except Ethiopia).  
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Table 5: Comparison to other local budgets in Indonesia 
Per household value of:  Mean 
Informal taxes as 
percent of…. 
From Indonesia household survey:    
Informal taxes  49.86  . 
Direct formal taxes  29.16              171% 
Indirect formal taxes  158.88                31% 
    
From village budget data:    
Total annual village budget:  117.64  42.4% 
Village revenue from inter-governmental transfers:  86.20  57.8% 
Village revenue from local taxes/fees (including informal tax):  31.44  158.6% 
    
From district budget data:    
Total annual district budget  1138.45  4.4% 
Expenditures on salaries:  474.89  10.5% 
Expenditures on goods & services  224.70  22.2% 
Capital expenditures:  396.90  12.6% 
    
District revenue from central government transfers:  933.07  5.3% 
District revenue from local formal taxes/fees:  43.41  114.9% 
District revenue from other sources:  31.77  156.9% 
Notes: All data comes from Indonesia, and all data are for 2007. All are the per-household amounts for the 
19 districts where we have complete data from the household survey, the village budget data, and the district 
budget data. For the village data, the source is the 2008 Census of Villages, matched to the same villages 
included in the household survey.  These district budgets also include the intergovernmental transfers to 
villages, so these budgets should be viewed as a superset of the village budgets.  All amounts are reported in 
2000 PPP US$, as in the previous tables, which translates to US$1 = Rp. 3571. Note that districts have 
budget deficits.  Informal taxation payments are not reported in district budgets, so double-counting is not 
an issue in this comparison. Some amount of informal taxes may be included in “village revenue from local 
taxes / fees” since this includes some in-kind revenues.  Household survey data weighted using household 
weights.  
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Table 6: Informal taxation vs. household expenditure 
   Philippines  Albania  Ethiopia  Guatemala  Indonesia   Panama  Nigeria   Vietnam   Nicaragua  Zambia 
Panel A:Participation margin, with community fixed effects  (conditional logit model) 
0.035  0.392*** 0.159  0.228*** 0.228*** 0.460*** 0.064  0.407***  -0.075  0.117***  Any 
payment  (0.114) (0.077) (0.159) (0.073) (0.061) (0.061) (0.048) (0.048) (0.086) (0.033) 
Observations       2200         2487        1165        5074         6188         5963         9036        24521         2669        10271 
 
Panel B: Total payments, with community fixed effects (Poisson model) 
0.395*  0.334***  0.127***   0.387***     0.080***      Total 
payments  (0.213)  (0.053)  (0.054)   (0.041)     (0.025)     
Observations       2143        1784        1062        10840           26899     
 
Panel C: Total payments, with community fixed effects, conditional on payments > 0 (Poisson model) 
0.229* 0.122***  0.111**   0.364***      0.001      Total 
payments  (0.117)  (0.043)  (0.049)   (0.041)     (0.021)     
Observations        655         254         587          9053           17310     
Notes: Each cell reports the estimates from a separate regression, with robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Panel A reports 
results from conditional logit estimates, where the dependent variable is a dummy for making any informal tax payments, the independent variable is log 
household expenditure per equivalent adult, and the conditioning variable is the village. Panel B reports results from conditional Poisson QMLE models, 
where the dependent variable is the quantity of informal tax payments (where labor payments are converted to monetary units at the household’s predicted 
wage rate), the independent variable is log household expenditure per equivalent adult, and the conditioning variable is the village. Panel C reports results 
from an analogous model to Panel B but without conditioning on the household having made a positive informal tax payment. * Significant at the 10% level; 
** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 7: Formal taxes vs. household expenditure: quantities  (H0 : χ=0)  
     Philippines Albania  Ethiopia  Indonesia    Vietnam 
 
Panel A: Informal taxes, with community fixed effects 
0.395* 0.334***  0.127***  0.387***  0.080***  Total payments 
(0.213) (0.053)  (0.054) (0.041)  (0.025) 
Observations  2143 1784 1062 10840 26899 
 
Panel B: Direct formal taxes, with community fixed effects 
1.526*** 1.433***  0.418*** 1.372***  0.691***  Total payments 
(0.198) (0.083)  (0.134) (0.075)  (0.114) 
Observations  2073 3358 1197 11591 20407 
 
Panel C: Informal taxes, without community fixed effects 
0.323* 0.384***  0.119  0.438***  -0.156***  Total payments 
(0.170) (0.049)  (0.112) (0.035)  (0.049) 
Observations  2200 2923 1062 11015 28858 
 
Panel D: Direct formal taxes, without community fixed effects 
1.483*** 1.421***  0.587**  1.467***  0.998***  Total payments 
  (0.211)  (0.056)  (0.257)  (0.135)  (0.067) 
Observations  2259 3838 1197 11674 29422 
Notes: Each cell reports the estimates from a separate regression, with robust standard errors clustered at the  
village level in parentheses. All results are from conditional Poisson QMLE models, where the dependent  
variable is given in the table, the independent variable is log household expenditure per equivalent adult,  
and (in Panels A and B) the conditioning variable is the village.  Significance is reported relative to the null  
hypothesis χ=0.  * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 8: Labor and money payments  (H0 : χ =0) 
   Indonesia   Panama  Vietnam   Nicaragua  Zambia 
       
Panel A: Participation margin 
0.210*** 0.206** -0.074  -0.071  0.097***  Labor 
payment  (0.060) (0.080) (0.066) (0.096) (0.035) 
Observations       6433       5782      14753       2225       8902 
       
0.705*** 0.682*** 0.538*** 0.003  0.128***  Money 
payment  (0.055) (0.068) (0.047) (0.121) (0.049) 
Observations      7313       5716       23780       1405       6701 
 
Panel B: Quantities 
0.260***   -0.018      Labor 
payment  (0.039)   (0.036)    
Observations     10840        15826     
         
1.446***   0.220***     Money 
payment  (0.208)   (0.026)    
Observations       7632         25429     
Notes: See Notes to Table 6. All specifications include community fixed effects.   
Significance is reported relative to the null hypothesis χ=0.  * Significant at the 10% level;  
** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
  
 
  
 
39
  
Table 9: User fees 
      Indonesia     Nicaragua     Nigeria     Panama     Zambia     Philippines 
 
Panel A: School 
Contributions    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
    
                             
Children in the HH  0.477**      0.617***      0.172      2.106***      0.827***      1.094*   
  (0.199)      (0.173)      (0.113)      (0.228)      (0.112)      (0.626)   
 
No private water  -0.117   
 
0.186   
 
  
 
-0.37   
 
0.464*   
 
-0.204 
 
  (0.345)      (0.263)           (0.359)      (0.248)      (0.538)   
 
Log expenditure per  0.348  0.307 
 
-0.09 -0.137 
 
0.0246 -0.0107 
 
-0.204** -0.459*** 
 
0.130*** 0.0786* 
 
0.362 0.284 
equivalent adult  (0.232)  (0.248)    (0.122) (0.115)    (0.098) (0.096)   (0.102) (0.095)    (0.049) (0.047)    (0.362) (0.394) 
 
Observations  1308 1308 
 
1743 1743 
 
2860 2860 
 
4767 4767 
 
8389 8389 
 
384 384 
                             
                            
Panel B: Water 
Contributions    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
    
 
Children in the HH  0.319**   
 
0.436   
 
  
 
0.365***   
 
0.183   
 
-1.077 
 
  (0.150)      (0.393)           (0.112)      (0.167)      (1.145)   
 
No private water  0.122   
 
3.382***   
 
  
 
1.190*   
 
1.438***   
 
-0.653 
 
  (0.237)      (0.484)           (0.623)      (0.375)      (1.032)   
 
Log expenditure per  0.227 0.192 
 
-0.167 -0.088 
 
  
 
0.048 0.004 
 
0.132 0.146* 
 
-0.191 -0.170 
equivalent adult  (0.167)  (0.165)    (0.258) (0.221)         (0.135) (0.133)    (0.089) (0.082)    (2.030) (1.817) 
 
Observations 1398  1398 
 
1076 1076 
 
  
 
3282 3282 
 
4096 4096 
 
102 102 
Notes: Each column reports results from conditional logit regressions, as in Panel A of Table 6, except the dependent variable is restricted to participation in payments for 
schools (Panel A) or participation in payments for water systems (Panel B). The first column for each country includes a dummy variable for missing water source.  
Households were defined as beneficiaries of public water if their listed primary source of drinking water was publicly provided, man-made, and more complex than a simple 
dug well. Natural sources (river, spring, rain, etc.), public or private dug wells, and other private water sources (piped water, tube wells, etc.) are not counted. Sources such as 
shared tube/piped wells and community water systems (publicly provided piped water, etc.) are included.  Households were defined as beneficiaries of schools if they had at 
least one member of school age (defined as between ages 4 and 14 years).  * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 10: Decisions about informal tax payments 
  Respondent 
 Individual  Village  Head 
1. Who makes decisions about which households participate?    
Village/hamlet/neighborhood head  81.3  79.5 
Village/hamlet/neighborhood meeting  38.5  54.8 
Each household decides for themselves  8.2  8.2 
    
2. Who determines how much is expected from each household?    
Village/hamlet/neighborhood head  63.4  56.8 
Village/hamlet/neighborhood meeting  40.7  61.2 
Each household decides for themselves  20.9  15.0 
    
3. What is the sanction imposed on a household if they do not 
participate?    
Replace at another time  10.5  12.9 
Give materials/food  11.1  20.0 
Replace with other person  5.2  9.3 
Pay another person to replace you  2.0  5.9 
Pay a fine  16.9  21.6 
Not allowed to use result of activity  0.1  0.6 
Excluded from local activities  0.5  0.6 
No specified sanction   63.0  54.5 
    
4. If applicable, who determines this sanction?    
Village/hamlet/neighborhood head  47.2  36.7 
Village/hamlet/neighborhood meeting  47.8  61.6 
Each household decides for themselves  22.0  20.8 
Notes: All data comes from Indonesia.  Multiple responses were allowed for each question. The full set of 
choices given for questions 1, 2, and 4 were: village head, hamlet head, neighborhood head, village 
meeting, hamlet meeting, neighborhood meeting, each household decides for themselves, religious 
leaders, other informal leaders, and other. For question 4, the choice of no sanction / not applicable was 
also given. The full set of choices given for question 3 was: replace at another time, give materials/food, 
replace with another person, pay another person to replace you, pay a fine, not allowed to use result of 
activity, excluded from local activities, other, and no official sanction.   
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1 Appendix A: Data
1.1 Survey Data
As described in the text, the data used in this paper stems from household surveys from 10 coun-
tries around the world, which were selected because they included questions on payments to local
public good provision. Since each of the surveys is somewhat di⁄erent in terms of sampling and
questionnaire design, this section brie￿ y describes each of these surveys one by one, including de-
tails on the informal tax question, sampling design, and the de￿nition of a community used for
community ￿xed e⁄ects. Since the derivation of VAT tax rates is somewhat more involved, Section
2 separately discusses the construction of implied VAT rates in each country in more detail.
In constructing the data, we use several normalizations to standardize the data. To standardize
units of time (e.g, for labor contributions) between surveys, we assume that each ￿day￿worked
is equivalent to 6 hours worked, and that there are 260 working days per year. When including
￿village￿￿xed e⁄ects, we use the smallest geographic unit available in the data. When the smallest
geographic unit includes both urban and rural areas, we interact the geographic unit with an
urban/rural dummy, so that each ￿village￿is entirely rural or entirely urban. We convert all local
currency units to 2000 PPP dollars after obtaining the exchange rate by dividing each country￿ s
GDP in local currency units for that year by the GDP in PPP constant 2000 international dollars.
This data is available in the World Bank World Development Indicators.
All our surveys (with exception of Ethiopia) provide a household level weight variable to account
for the sampling procedure. We used these weights in calculating the descriptive statistics (Table
3), as well as in all our regression analysis.
1.1.1 Albania
We use the Albanian Living Standards Measurement Survey, conducted in mid-2005 by the Living
Standards Unit of Albania￿ s National Statistical Institute, with the technical assistance of the World
Bank. This survey is the fourth round of a series of LSMS, which began in 1996. The survey covers
3,840 households in urban and rural areas and is nationally representative.
Our estimation of payments is based on questions 12 and 13 of the Social Capital module of the
household questionnaire. These questions ask about the payment of the entire household and cover
￿participation in any activities, in which people come together to do some work for the bene￿t of
community.￿Conditional on a positive response to this question, the following question asks about
￿how many times in the past year￿the household has participated in such activities. Each ￿time￿
was counted as a working day.
Communities are de￿ned as villages, which are subgroups of districts and municipalities.
1.1.2 Ethiopia
We use the Ethiopia Rural Household Survey, which covers 1,507 rural households. This survey was
been conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute in 1997 as the fourth round of
the series of household surveys started in 1989.
1We examine questions from the Community Work section of the household questionnaire. The
￿rst question asks whether the ￿household engaged in community work in the last 12 months.￿The
following question inquires about ￿how many days the household engaged in community work.￿
The survey documentation notes that ￿... these data are not nationally representative. However,
they can be considered broadly representative of households in non-pastoralist farming systems as
of 1994.￿
Communities are de￿ned as peasant associations, which are subgroups of regions and woredas
(subdistricts).
1.1.3 Guatemala
We use the Guatemala Living Standards Survey (Encuesta Nacional Sobre Condiciones de Vida),
which covers 8,940 household in rural as well as urban areas. This nationally representative survey
was conducted in 2000 by the Guatemalan National Statistics Institute, with the technical and
￿nancial assistance of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.
We used question II.A.1.l, which asks whether households ￿participate in the collective con-
struction of community works (roads, schools, etc).￿ Two other questions, II.A.1.h and IX.E.3,
which asked respectively about cash or in-kind donations and the amount of hours contributed per
household, were not used. The decision to exclude those is due to the ambiguity of the former and
the fact that the recall period of the latter was only one day.
Communities are de￿ned as sectors, which are subgroups of regions, departments, and munici-
pios.
1.1.4 Indonesia
We use Wave I of the Indonesian Health and Education Service Survey, which was conducted
by Gadjah Mada University and the World Bank as a baseline survey for the evaluation of the
PNPM-Generasi program (see Olken, Onishi and Wong 2008). The survey was conducted in June
￿August 2007, and took place in rural areas of 5 provinces in Indonesia. 12,000 households were
interviewed, spread over approximately 2,400 villages. Because the survey followed the placement
of the PNPM-Generasi program (and associated control areas), the 20% richest districts in each
province are not included.
We designed short modules on informal taxation administered to households and to village
heads. The module began by asking ￿Has there been community activities in repair/ cleaning/
maintenance/ construction of village/neighborhood infrastructure and facilities during the last 12
months?￿If yes, the household was asked if they participated in the activities, and if so, what type of
activity (road/bridge, schools, water/sanitation systems, irrigation systems, or religious/cemetery
projects). Households were then asked how many total person-hours the household contributed as
well as total cash and materials payments over the previous 12 months. Finally, both households
and village heads were asked a series of questions about who decides how much each household
should contribution and the sanctions for non-contribution; these questions are described in detail
in the text.
Communities are de￿ned as villages, which are subgroups of provinces, districts, and subdis-
tricts.
21.1.5 Nigeria
We examine the 2004 Nigerian Living Standards Survey. This nationally representative survey is
a continuation of the series of National Integrated Surveys of Households conducted since 1981
by Federal O¢ ce of Statistics of Nigeria. The survey collected data on 19,158 households from
September 2003 to August 2004.
We use questions four and ￿ve of section eight, Social Capital and Community Participation.
These questions asked ￿Do you or any member of your household participate in community pro-
gram(s)?￿and, if yes, ￿Which of the following programs do you or a member of your household
participate in?￿We include in our estimation participation in the following categories: ￿construc-
tion of community school,￿￿maintenance of community roads and bridges,￿and participation ￿in
community development project.￿While the survey does not specify a recall period for these ques-
tions, the instructions to the interviewer specify a recall period of 1 year for the previous question
regarding ￿Coping Mechanisms in times of need.￿We therefore take the recall period as 1 year.
Communities are de￿ned as the urban or rural subsections of unique rics, which are subgroups
of states.
1.1.6 Nicaragua
We use data from the second Nicaraguan LSMS, ￿Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medici￿n de
Niveles de Vida.￿They survey was conducted in 1998 by the National Institute for Statistics and
the Census of Nicaragua with technical assistance from the World Bank. It covers 4,209 households
in both urban and rural areas of all 15 departments and two autonomous regions, and is nationally
representative
Question 57 of the household survey asks about household payments to construction and/or
improvement of public facilities, such as schools, health centers, etc. The question also asks the
respondent to indicate what ￿the contribution of this household was/were,￿allowing us to sepa-
rate labor and monetary payments. Note, however, that question 57 is conditional on a question
55, which asks households whether they were bene￿ciaries of any construction or improvement
projects. Thus, our estimation is a lower-bound for the real proportion of household payments,
since households who do not receive bene￿ts might also contribute.
Communities are de￿ned as segementos, which are subgroups of departamentos, municipios,
and areas de supervision.
1.1.7 Panama
The 2003 Panama Living Standards Survey, Encuesta de Niveles de Vida, provides data from
6,363 households in rural and urban areas, and is nationally representative. It was designed and
conducted by the Panamanian Ministry of Economy and Finance with the assistance of the World
Bank.
Questions 2.A.1.a and 2.A.1.e ask households whether they have participated in works to bene￿t
their or other communities (roads, schools, etc.) and whether they have donated money or goods
for community works over the past 12 months.
Communities are de￿ned as corregimientos, which are subgroups of regions, provinces, and
districts.
31.1.8 Philippines
We use the baseline survey of the KALAHI-CIDSS project for the Philippines (see Chase and
Holmemo 2005). It was conducted by the World Bank by the Asia-Paci￿c Policy Center as a
baseline for the evaluation of the KALAHI program, and covers 2,401 households. Due to the goals
of the project, these households were selected only from rural areas of the 42 poorest provinces in
the country, although each of the three geographical areas of the Philippines are represented.
Question 1a, part E of the household survey asks whether households participate in community
projects: ￿Over the past six months, did you or any member of your family participate in any
bayanihan in the barangay?￿If yes, question 1ai asks for the three main activities and 1aiii provides
a measure of the total time contributed to these three (per hours) for the period of the six months
preceding the administration of the survey. We used a ratio of 6 hours per working day to convert
the data to a daily measure. For our measure of participation, we included activities related to
public cleaning, beauti￿cation, repair, construction, and other infrastructure work.
Communities are de￿nes as barangays, which are subgroups of provinces and municipalities.
1.1.9 Vietnam
The 2002 Vietnam LSMS survey is nationally representative and covers 29,532 households in both
rural and urban areas. The survey was conducted by the General Statistical O¢ ce of Vietnam with
technical assistance from the World Bank.
Question 3.18 of the household survey asks: ￿Have you contributed any public working days?￿
If yes, labor quantity information is provided in question 3.19: ￿In the past 12 months how many
public working days without pay did you contribute?￿
Information on monetary donations is found in question 6.b.3.1.402, which asks whether contri-
butions were made in the last 12 months to public labor, and question 6.b.3.2.402 which asks the
monetary value given in the last 12 months.
Communities are de￿ned as communes/towns, which are subgroups of provinces/cities and
districts.
1.1.10 Zambia
The 1998 Zambia Living Conditions Monitoring Survey is nationally representative and covers
16,710 rural and urban households. The survey was conducted by the Central Statistical O¢ ce of
Zambia.
Question 13.3 asks whether certain community projects (building/rehabilitations of school,
health facility, roads, etc.) took place in the previous ￿ve years. If yes, question 13.18 of the
household survey asks: ￿Did any member of your household participate in provision of materials,
labour, management, or funds to the project?￿Respondents can specify which of these categories
they contributed, if any.
Communities are de￿ned as centralities, which are subgroups of provinces, districts, census
supervisory areas, standard enumeration areas, and stratum.
1.2 Construction of formal taxation variables
We construct formal taxation payments for all countries for which we have data on the quantity of
informal tax payments: Albania, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. We consider both direct
4tax payments by households, as well as indirect payments in the form of consumption taxes.
1.2.1 Direct taxes
To capture direct tax payments, we use all available questions in household surveys that measure
taxation directly, either as part of household expenditure or as part of non-farm business expendi-
tures. Appendix Table 1 (below) shows all these variables and their questions and recall periods.
We use the listed recall periods to normalize taxes to an annual basis.
1.2.2 Indirect taxes
The tax structure of each country was investigated to determine the sources of indirect taxation
for households. To maintain comparable construction of the variable across countries, we estimate
indirect taxes as total value-added tax (VAT) combined with excise taxes paid on fuel, tobacco,
and alcohol. Note that this measure does not include tari⁄s on imports and exports, which are a
non-trivial component of indirect formal taxation in developing countries.
We construct the VAT base to include household expenditures unrelated to health, food, or
education, as these categories are usually VAT exempt. Even to the extent that food is subject to
VAT, since food purchases are predominantly in the informal sector, they are likely to be de facto
exempt from VAT in our sample countries. Tobacco, alcohol, and fuel expenditures are considered
separately due to their special rates of taxation.
The Ethiopian and Vietnamese surveys record the value of purchased alcohol separately from
the value of alcohol self-produced or received as a gift. In these cases, we include only the value of
purchased alcohol for tax consideration.
For each expenditure category, we calculate tax paid as follows:
Taxes =
Tax Rate
1 + Tax Rate
￿ Expenditure
The following sections report the details of the tax rates used in VAT calculations. The sources
are shown in Appendix Table 2, and the recall periods for the corresponding questions are shown
in Appendix Table 3.
Albania: The VAT and the tobacco excise tax were de￿ned at 20% and 60%, respectively (see
Table 2 below for relevant sources). Excise tax was de￿ned at 50% for beer and varied from 16-
100% for other types of alcohol. The excise tax on fuel ranged from 50-90% for the most important
sources. Using this information, we chose the categorical tax rates for VAT (20%), tobacco (60%),
alcohol (50%), and fuel (80%).
Ethiopia: The tobacco and alcohol excise taxes were set o¢ cially at 50% and 75%, respectively.
A sales tax, rather than a VAT, was de￿ned ranging from 5-15% by type of good or service. The
majority of the goods included in our VAT base fell into the upper sales tax category and the only
fuel source found to be tax exempt was kerosene. As such, we de￿ned the categorical tax rates for
VAT (15%), tobacco (75%), alcohol (50%), and fuel (15%).
Indonesia: The VAT was set at 10% and no fuel tax was charged. Tobacco was subject to an
8.4% VAT, an ad valorem tax ranging from 4-40% by type and production scale, and a speci￿c tax
ranging from 0-2%. The World Bank estimated the tobacco tax share as 30% of total retail price
in 1999. Alcohol was charged VAT, excise tax, and luxury sales tax. The luxury sales tax was
540% for types of alcohol below 52 proof and 75% for those above. The excise tax on alcohol varied
based on proof as well. Taking this information into account, we de￿ned the categorical tax rates
for VAT (10%), tobacco (30%), alcohol (75%), and fuel (0%).
Philippines: The VAT was de￿ned at 10% and was included in addition to excise tax for alcohol,
tobacco, and fuel. While the tobacco excise tax varied by product type, the World Bank estimated
the tobacco tax share as 63% of average retail price in 1999. The excise taxes on fuel and alcohol
varied, respectively, by product type and by product type, price, and proof. Taking these facts into
consideration, we chose the categorical tax rates for VAT (10%), tobacco (63%), alcohol (50%), and
fuel (25%).
Vietnam: The fuel excise tax was de￿ned at 10% and there were three categories of VAT at 5, 10,
and 15%, with the majority of VAT base goods falling into the middle category. The tobacco excise
tax varied based on product type and was set at 25, 45, or 65%. The World Bank estimated the
tobacco tax share as 36% of average retail price in 1999. The alcohol excise tax varied by product
type and proof. With this information, we de￿ned the categorical tax rates for VAT (10%), tobacco
(36%), alcohol (35%), and fuel (10%).
Table A1: Questions used in total direct tax estimation
Year
Recall
Period
Albania 2005 "Taxes and insurance" reported in non-farm business 1 month
"Other Taxes (vehicle, radio and TV, etc)" reported in
expenditure
12
Months
Ethiopia 1997 "Taxes and Levies" reported in expenditure 4 Months
Indonesia 2007 "Land and house tax; Vehicle tax; Income tax; Other taxes"
reported in expenditure
12
months
Philippines 2003 "Taxes (income tax, real estate tax, car registration, etc.)"
reported in expenditure 6 Months
Vietnam 2002 "All kinds of taxes (excluding production tax)" reported in
expenditure
12
Months
Table A2: Sources for VAT and excise tax rates
Albania Law No. 7928/1995; Law No. 8437/1998
Ethiopia Proclamation No.68/1993; Proclamation No. 77/1997
Indonesia Law No. 17/2000; Jakarta Post/July 19.2004; Tobacco Economics in
Indonesia/2008; The Tobacco Source Book, Ministry of Health Republic of
Indonesia/2004;
Philippines Republic Act No. 8424/1997; World Bank Vietnam Tobacco Country Brief/1999
Vietnam Law No. 2/1997/QH9; World Bank Vietnam Tobacco Country Brief/1999
6Table A3: Recall periods for indirect tax questions
VAT base Tobacco Alcohol Fuel
Albania 30 days 30 days 30 days 30 days
Ethiopia 4 months 4 months 1 week 1 month
Indonesia 12 months 1 week 1 week 12 months
Philippines 6 months 3 days 3 days 1 month
Vietnam 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months
1.3 Dropping of Outliers
We drop observations for which any of the following three are true: (a) the reported total household
days of labor contributed in the last year exceeds 50% of total possible yearly household working
days (de￿ned as 250 multiplied by the number of workers in the household); (b) the total monetized
value of reported household days of labor contributed in the last year exceeds 50% of total yearly
household expenditure; (c) the total reported value of yearly direct taxes exceeds total yearly
household expenditure.
These restrictions a⁄ect only the data from Indonesia (0.22% dropped), Ethiopia (1.98% dropped),
and Vietnam (0.01% dropped).
1.4 Wage Prediction and Household Expenditure Measure
To predict wages, we ￿rst approximate monthly household income per worker as annual household
expenditure divided by 12 and the number of workers in the household. (We follow the standard
convention of using household expenditure as a proxy for household income.) We then regress the
household monthly wage rate on each individual￿ s education, age, and age squared interacted with
a female dummy, an urban dummy, and a female x urban dummy. We then divide by the number
of working days in a month, which we de￿ne as 21.7, to get a measure of the household daily wage
rate. 21.7 ’ (365.25/12)*( 5/7), where 5/7 adjusts the wage rate for working days per week. We
repeat this prediction separately for each country.
We use equivalent household expenditure as our household income measure when examining
the distributional implications of informal taxation. Since household expenditure includes direct
and indirect taxes, it is conceptually a "pre-tax" measure. To be consistent, one might also want
to add back income lost as a result of informal tax payments. Since our measure of the household
wage rate is likely to be noisy, we do not make this adjustment.
Following Deaton (1997), we de￿ne equivalent expenditure as
household expenditure
(adults + ￿1children + ￿2infants)
￿
Infants are de￿ned as those aged 0-4; children are de￿ned as those aged 5 to 14. Combining Deaton￿ s
estimates of total child costs and Olken (2005)￿ s estimates of household economies of scale, we set
￿1 = 0:6 and ￿2 = 0:5 and ￿ = 0:85.
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82 Appendix B: An Optimal Tax Model of Informal Taxation
The stylized facts we observe are remarkably consistent across countries. This appendix develops
a simple framework for thinking about informal taxation that does not require non-standard pref-
erences, government corruption, or market failures in labor or credit markets, but instead treats
informal taxation as one possible solution to an optimal tax problem, with asymmetric information
and screening. We treat the local government as the unit of observation and abstract from the
existence of a central government.
In our model, local governments face a standard problem: ￿nancing local public goods in a
social welfare maximizing way. We consider three sources of departure from the ￿rst best. As in
standard taxation models, governments face information constraints about true earnings ability.
Our model adds two additional constraints: governments may face constraints on their ability to
enforce the desired tax schedule, and they may also face constraints on labor taxes, since individuals
can shirk on required labor payments. These information and enforcement constraints limit the
degree to which the government can achieve redistribution in ￿nancing the public good.
We model formal and informal taxes as having di⁄erent constraint parameters arising from
di⁄erences in their tax technologies. In the informal system, enforcement happens through social
sanctions rather than through courts. This means that the informal system must use less severe
punishments than the formal system, i.e., social sanctions instead of jail time. However, the informal
tax system can use information that does not meet the burden of proof required in court (i.e.,
information that is observable but not veri￿able), so it e⁄ectively has better information than the
formal tax system. 1
We demonstrate that informal taxation may be the optimal solution to the government￿ s con-
strained maximization problem and show that the model￿ s predictions are consistent with the
observed patterns of informal tax prevalence. We also show that the predictions of the model
match the stylized facts on the distribution and form of informal tax payments.
Modeling these payments as the equilibrium of a screening mechanism di⁄ers from the literature
on voluntary contributions to public goods, which often models contributions driven by a personal
desire to a⁄ect the level of the public good (e.g., Olson 1965), a warm-glow from donations (e.g.,
Andreoni 1990), or to signal wealth to others (e.g., Glazer and Konrad 1996). others have modeled
private provision of public goods in a collective action framework (e.g., Bagnoli and Lipman 1999,
Bergstrom, et al. 1986). Masclet, et al. (2003) and Falk et al. (2005) have emphasized the role
of social sanctions as a mechanism through which the free rider problem can be overcome, and
Fehr and Gachter (2000) show experimentally that cooperators are willing to punish free-riders
even if this is costly for them and even if they cannot expect future bene￿ts from their punishment
activities.2 To the best of our knowledge, little work has focused on formally modeling informal tax
mechanisms speci￿cally. An exception is Wilson (1992), who argues that cooperation in a repeated
prisoner￿ s dilemma game may be sustainable in the context of harambee programs in Kenya.
1Another possible constraint on redistribution is exit from the local community. Exit would a⁄ect both formal
and informal taxes in the same way, so for simplicity, we do not consider the issue of exit here. In practice, mobility
is often low in developing countries (Bardhan 2002). Abramitzky (2008) explores the issue of exit as a constraint on
redistribution in a di⁄erent context, that of Israeli kibbutzim.
2On the empirical side, the lower public good provision in ethnically diverse communities has been explained using
the theory of social sanctions: Miguel and Gugerty (2005) argue that social sanctions are harder to enforce between
di⁄erent ethnic groups, which explains the lower contributions to public goods in diverse communities. Alesina et al.
(1999) also show empirically that more diverse communities have lower public good provision.
9This section proceeds as follows. We begin by setting up the general social planner￿ s maxi-
mization problem as a two-type screening model with enforcement and information constraints and
discuss characteristics of the general solution. We then introduce informal and formal taxation
in the context of this model by varying the enforcement and information constraints. Finally, we
discuss the implications of the model for the empirics of informal taxation.
2.1 Model
2.1.1 Setup
Suppose that there are N individuals. A fraction ￿ of the individuals have wage wH and a frac-
tion 1 ￿ ￿ have wage wL where wL < wH. We assume that w is private information and that
each individual has an endowment of time 1 which they spend working. Since we are primarily
interested in the tradeo⁄ between enforcement and information, we model all behavioral responses
coming through an evasion decision rather than through a labor supply decision. This assumption
seems plausible in the contexts we are studying, and also allows us to capture the idea that local
communities may have information on earnings ability rather than just earnings. Each individual￿ s
wealth is therefore equal to his wage rate. There are no savings, so individuals consume their entire
wealth after paying any taxes.
Each individual i can potentially consume two goods, the private good (wi) and the public good
(g). If the public good is provided, all individuals consume it and g = 1; if it is not provided, then
g = 0. We assume that utility over the private good is concave and that the utility from the private
and public good are separable, i.e.
U = u(wi) + ￿g
where u is concave and ￿ indicates the value from consuming the public good. We assume that u
has the property that the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is greater than 1 (i.e.,
￿wu00(w)
u0(w) > 1).3
The public good costs G to produce, and once produced is both non-rival and non-excludable.
G is determined exogenously.4 For the public good to be provided, total government revenue R
must be greater than or equal to G. We assume that providing the public good is e¢ cient, so that
the ￿rst-best involves providing the public good.
We assume that the goal of the government is to ￿nance the public good in a way that maxi-
mizes social welfare. Taxes cannot be negative; in other words, redistribution occurs only through
progressive payments toward the public good.5
3This assumption guarantees a single-crossing property which is necessary to allow screening using labor taxes
(￿), discussed in more detail below. To see this, note that
@
2U
@￿@w
= ￿wu
00 (w) ￿ u
0 (w)
If
￿wu00(w)
u0(w) > 1, then
@2U
@￿@w > 0, so that the marginal utility cost of an extra hour worked is strictly increasing in
wealth.
4We focus here on the decisions made by local government trying to raised a ￿xed amount of revenue to ￿nance
a public good, abstracting from intergovernmental transfers and endogenous public good size.
5In a system where a large share of payments take the form of in-kind unskilled labor, positive net transfers (i.e.,
net receipt of unskilled labor) could be di¢ cult to implement. In addition, we can observe only payments (either
zero or positive) to the public good in the data. General transfer payments, if any, may occur through a di⁄erent
mechanism. In this respect, we can think of informal taxation as somewhat analagous to a property tax system (a
tax levied to ￿nance a set of goods) that may exist in addition to a traditional income tax and transfer system.
10Taxes can potentially be levied in two forms: money and labor. De￿ne ￿H and ￿L as the
monetary payments from the high and low type. De￿ne ￿H and ￿L as the labor payments from
the high and low type, de￿ned as a share of each type￿ s total time budget. After-tax income for
type i is then wi (1 ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿i.
We assume that ￿i is publicly valued at the low type wage rate wL, i.e., ￿ is always used for
low-skill tasks. This implies that labor by the high type is ine¢ cient, since it is valued at the
opportunity cost wH by the high type but valued at wL in the government budget constraint. As
we show below, this asymmetry in the value of labor means that the government can use labor as
a screening device.6
We assume that the social planner faces three types of constraints in designing the optimal
allocation. First, there is the enforcement constraint: if a given type fails to pay his required taxes,
the planner can impose a utility punishment up to a maximum of P. This punishment P enters the
planner￿ s problem as an IR constraint. Second, there is the hidden income constraint: by paying a
utility cost D, a high type can hide his income and pretend to be a low type. Third, there is the
shirking constraint: by paying a utility cost S, the type who is supposed to do the higher amount
of work in labor can shirk and do only the lowest amount of labor required of any type (denoted
￿).7 The hidden income and shirking constraints enter the planner￿ s problem as IC constraints.
Together, the triplet of costs, (P;D;S), is what we refer to as the technology of the tax system.
We will model informal vs. formal taxation as having di⁄erent tax system technologies.
2.1.2 Planner￿ s problem and characteristics of the solution
Faced with a given tax technology (P;D;S), the social planner￿ s problem is to maximize social
welfare subject to the enforcement (IR), hidden income (IC), and shirking (IC) constraints, i.e., he
solves:
max
(￿i;￿i)
￿(u(wH (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(u(wL (1 ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿L)) + ￿ (1)
subject to the enforcement constraints (IR):
u(wH) ￿ P ￿ u(wH (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H) (ECH)
u(wL) ￿ P ￿ u(wL (1 ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿L) (ECL)
hidden income constraints (IC):
u(wH (1 ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿L) ￿ D ￿ u(wH (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H) (HIH)
u(wL (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H) ￿ D ￿ u(wL (1 ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿L) (HIL)
shirking constraints (IC):
u(wH (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿H) ￿ S ￿ u(wH (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H) (SCH)
u(wL (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿L) ￿ S ￿ u(wL (1 ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿L) (SCL)
6While use of labor as a screening device has been considered in the design of income maintenance programs (e.g.,
?), it has not, to the best of our knowledge, been considered in the context of raising revenue.
7Note that hiding income allows the high type to pretend to be the low type and pay the labor and money taxes
required by the low type, whereas shirking allows each type to do the minimum amount of required labor without
a⁄ecting the monetary taxes.
11the government budget constraint:
￿(￿H + wL￿H) + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿L + wL￿L) =
G
N
and non-negativity constraints:
￿i ￿ 0, ￿i ￿ 0 8i
Note that in the ￿rst best (when no constraints bind), the planner will set taxes so that the
after-tax marginal utilities are equal for the two types; if the non-negativity constraint binds, the
optimum in the ￿rst-best will be to set ￿￿
L = 0 and ￿￿
H = G
￿N.
Several comments are worth making about the general solution to this problem. We ￿rst
examine the form of tax payments of each type and then discuss the distributional implications.
Remark 1 The high type will always pay in money, not in labor.
Proof. Suppose that, at the optimum payment level, ￿H > 0.
(i) Suppose SCL does not bind.
Let the payment of the high type change to the new levels ￿￿
H = ￿H ￿ ￿ and ￿￿
H = ￿H + wL￿,
for some small ￿ > 0. At these new payment levels, the shirking constraint for both types would
still hold.
For HIH :
u(wH (1 ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿L) ￿ D ￿ u(wH (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H) ￿ u(wH (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H + (wH ￿ wL)￿) =
u(wH (1 ￿ ￿￿
H) ￿ ￿￿
H) =) HIH still holds for ￿￿
H and ￿￿
H:
For ECH : u(wH) ￿ P ￿ u(wH (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H) ￿ u(wH (1 ￿ ￿￿
H) ￿ ￿￿
H) =) ECH still holds
for ￿￿
H and ￿￿
H:
HIL, ECL, the government budget constraint and the low type￿ s utility are una⁄ected by the
changes in the high type￿ s payments.
The high type￿ s utility now becomes:
u(wH (1 ￿ ￿￿
H) ￿ ￿￿
H) = u(wH (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H + ￿(wH ￿ wL)) > u(wH (1 ￿ ￿H)￿￿H): Thus, the
high type can be made strictly better o⁄ without violating any of the constraints.
(ii) Suppose SCL binds.
This implies ￿L > 0. Let the payments of the two types change such that, for some small ￿ > 0;
￿￿
L = ￿L ￿ ￿;￿￿
H = ￿H ￿ ￿;￿￿
L = ￿L + wL￿ and ￿￿
H = ￿H + wL￿.
Decreasing ￿L and ￿H by ￿ and increasing ￿L by ￿ would not change the low type￿ s income or
the SCL constraint. So SCL will still hold.
We next check that SCH is still satis￿ed at the new payment levels.
At the previous allocation, S ￿ u(wH (1 ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿H) ￿ u(wH (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H). At the new
allocation, income in both utility terms is increased by ￿(wH ￿ wL) > 0. Since the utility function
is concave, this change will decrease the right-hand side of the inequality, so SCH will still be
satis￿ed.
As above, HIH, E _ CH, HIL, and ECL will continue to hold at the new payment levels. The
government budget constraint and the low type￿ s utility are una⁄ected by the changes in payments.
As before, the high type￿ s utility now becomes:
u(wH (1 ￿ ￿￿
H) ￿ ￿￿
H) = u(wH (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H + ￿(wH ￿ wL)) > u(wH (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H), so the
high type can be made strictly better o⁄ without violating any of the constraints.
12Thus, in both (i) and (ii), 8￿H > 0;social welfare can be increased without violating any of the
constraints =) at the optimum level of payments, ￿H = 0:
The fact that the high type always pays in money, not labor, is the equivalent of the "no
distortion at the top" result from the optimal tax literature (Mirrlees 1971). Note that this is not
simply a productive e¢ ciency result; as we discuss below, it can be optimal to have low types make
ine¢ cient payments in labor, but it will never be optimal to have the highest type do so.
The shirking constraint determines the degree to which labor can be used as a screening device
and therefore the form of payment of the low type:
Remark 2 As the utility cost of shirking (S) increases, the low type￿ s taxes will weakly shift towards
taxes in labor, i.e.,
@
￿
wL￿L
WL￿L+￿L
￿
@S ￿ 0, with the inequality strict whenever ECH does not bind and
￿L > 0.
Proof. Notice that the non-negativity constraint and the fact that ￿H = 0 at the optimum
(Remark 1) imply ￿ = 0 and SCH is slack.
Assume that there exists an allocation ￿L ￿ 0, ￿L > 0;￿H ￿ 0 such that the constraints are
satis￿ed and the public good is provided. Thus, S ￿ u(wL ￿ ￿L) ￿ u(wL (1 ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿L):
Let S￿ = S + ￿S, ￿S > 0: Thus, S￿ > u(wL ￿ ￿L) ￿ u(wL (1 ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿L) and SCL is slack.
For some small ￿ > 0, let ￿￿
L = ￿L ￿ wL￿ and ￿￿
L = ￿L + ￿. At these new payment levels SCH
and SCL would still be satis￿ed.
Since u(wL (1 ￿ ￿￿
L) ￿ ￿￿
L) = u(wL (1 ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿L), HIL and ECL are unchanged. ECH is also
unchanged.
However,
u(wH (1 ￿ ￿￿
L) ￿ ￿￿
L) ￿ D = u(wH (1 ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿L ￿ ￿(wH ￿ wL)) ￿ D < u(wH (1 ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿L) ￿
u(wH (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H) =) HIH is slack 8D ￿ 0. Thus, HIH would be satis￿ed for higher values of
￿H. This is because it would now cost the high type more in foregone income if he were to deviate
to the low type￿ s tax package.
Since u(wH (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H) > u(wL(1 ￿ ￿￿
L) ￿ ￿￿
L) and the utility function is concave,
u0 (wH (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H) < u0(wL(1 ￿ ￿￿
L) ￿ ￿￿
L).
Therefore, if ECH is not binding at ￿H, 9￿ > 0 such that increasing ￿H by ￿=￿ and decreasing
￿L by ￿=(1 ￿ ￿) will still satisfy HIH and improve social welfare. If ECH binds at ￿H, then the
change in the low type￿ s tax mix (and the resulting slackness of HIH) does not allow for a change
in ￿H:Therefore, the total tax payments and the utilities of the two types will be una⁄ected.
Hence, as S￿ increases, it is weakly optimal to decrease ￿L. Therefore, 9S0 > 0 such that
8S ￿ S0 setting ￿L = 0 can weakly increase social welfare. In this case, it is weakly better for the
low type to pay only in labor and not in money, if his optimal total tax payment is positive.
Since an hour of the low type￿ s labor is publicly valued at the low type￿ s outside wage rate,
having the low type pay in labor does not a⁄ect the government budget constraint. It does, however,
allow for screening by a⁄ecting the high type￿ s hidden income constraint: it would now cost the
high type more in foregone income if he were to deviate to the low type￿ s tax package and pay labor
instead of money. As long as ECH is slack (in other words, as long as it is possible to increase
the tax payment of the high type without violating his IR constraint), then shifting the low type
toward labor will allow the planner to improve social welfare.
If the shirking constraint for the low type does bind (from Remark 1, we know that ￿ = 0 at
the optimum), then there are limits to the degree to which labor can be used as a screening device.
13In this case, ￿L could be positive, and the inability to screen using labor could reduce the overall
progressivity of the tax system or make it no longer optimal to provide the public good. Note that
if instead the required labor was high skilled (could only be provided by the high type), there would
be no screening bene￿t from labor taxes. One implication is that such projects are less likely to
take place.
We next examine the distribution of payments:
Remark 3 As long as the planner has some information (either D > 0 or S > 0) and P >
u(wH) ￿ u
￿
wH ￿ G
N
￿
, then if the public good is provided, total payments will be strictly increasing
in household expenditure, i.e., it will always be the case that ￿H + wH￿H > ￿L + wL￿L:
Proof. First assume the social planner maximizes social welfare when ￿H+wH￿H < ￿L+wL￿L.
Now consider the allocation ￿H = ￿L = G
N. If the constraints for the low type were satis￿ed at
the previous allocation, they will still be satis￿ed at the new allocation. HIH and SCH will be
satis￿ed for D = 0 and S = 0, and ECH will be satis￿ed as long as P ￿ u(wH) ￿ u
￿
wH ￿ G
N
￿
.
Since wH > wL and the utility function is concave, the new allocation will result in a social welfare
improvement.
Now assume the social planner maximizes social welfare when ￿H + wH￿H = ￿L + wL￿L.
(i) Suppose S = 0.
From Remark 1, we know that ￿H = 0 and therefore ￿ = 0. S = 0 and the government
budget constraint then imply that ￿L = 0 and ￿H = ￿L = G
N. At this allocation, HIH will be
satis￿ed at D = 0 and is therefore slack 8D > 0. If the condition given in the remark holds (i.e.,
P > u(wH) ￿ u
￿
wH ￿ G
N
￿
), then ECH will also be slack.
Then 9￿ > 0 such that HIH and ECH are still satis￿ed for ￿￿
H = ￿H+￿=￿ and ￿￿
L = ￿L￿￿=(1￿￿):
This change in ￿H and ￿L leaves the government budget constraint unchanged. If the constraints
for the low type were satis￿ed at (￿H;￿L), they will still be satis￿ed at (￿￿
H;￿￿
L).
Since the utility function is concave, u0 ￿
wH ￿ G
N
￿
< u0 ￿
wL ￿ G
N
￿
. Therefore, increasing ￿H by
￿=￿ and decreasing ￿L by ￿=(1 ￿ ￿) will improve social welfare.
(ii) Suppose D = 0.
From Remark 1, we know that ￿H = 0 and therefore ￿ = 0, so SCH is slack. If D = 0, HIH
can be rewritten as
u(wH ￿ ￿H) ￿ u(wH (1 ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿L)
HIH will be slack for the allocation given (￿H = ￿L + wL￿L) as long as ￿L > 0. As above, if
P > u(wH) ￿ u
￿
wH ￿ G
N
￿
, then ECH will also be slack.
If the allocation given has ￿L > 0, then we can achieve a social welfare improvement by increas-
ing ￿H and reducing ￿L as in case (i) above.
Now suppose the allocation given has ￿L = 0. SCL will then be binding at S = 0 and slack
for 8S > 0. Then, 9￿ > 0 such that we can set ￿￿
L = ￿ and ￿￿
L = ￿L ￿ wL￿ and SCL will still
be satis￿ed. This change does not a⁄ect the total tax payment of the low type, the government
budget constraint or HIL. We can then achieve a social welfare improvement by increasing ￿H and
reducing ￿L as in case (i) above.
Thus as long as the government has any information and su¢ cient ability to enforce, the tax
14system will be redistributive ￿i.e., the high type will pay more in taxes than the low type.8 This
result comes directly from the fact that the planner is maximizing social welfare and the marginal
utility of income is higher for the low type. The di⁄erence in tax payments between the two types
is weakly increasing in the wage gap between the two types.
The fact that the high type pays more does not necessarily imply that the tax system will be
progressive ￿i.e., it does not imply that the high type will pay more in taxes as a share of income
than the low type. In fact, whether the tax system is progressive or regressive is theoretically
ambiguous and depends on the parameters of the model.
It is also important to note that while the utility costs (P;D;S) represent a social loss, none
of these costs should be borne in equilibrium. E¢ ciency costs relative to the ￿rst best instead
take two forms. First, the public good may not be provided whereas it will always be provided in
the ￿rst best. This may occur if the government cannot satisfy the enforcement and information
constraints and still meet its budget constraint or if redistribution is limited enough that providing
the public good actually reduces social welfare. Second, in a multiple type case, it may be optimal
for the government to require ine¢ cient labor payments from individuals whose wage rate exceeds
the unskilled wage rate, since those labor payments serve as a screening device for higher wage
types. We discuss extensions to the multiple type case in more detail below.
2.1.3 Formal vs. informal taxes
We model formal and informal taxation as having di⁄erent technology triplets. Formal taxes are
thus represented by the triplet (PF;DF;SF) whereas informal taxes are represented by the triplet
(PI;DI;SI). We assume that PF ￿ PI ￿i.e., the punishments that can be imposed by the courts,
conditional on detecting non-compliance, are at least as great as the punishments that can be
imposed informally through social sanctions.9 By using the formal legal system, the social planner
can in theory levy an unlimited punishment if the individual does not meet his required payments
(for example, through imprisonment); in the informal tax system, there are likely to be limits on the
sanctions that can be imposed for non-payment. We can think of the costs of evading income (D)
or evading labor taxes (S) as inversely related to the information the community needs to impose
punishment. A conviction in the formal legal system is likely to require a higher level of proof than
a community needs to impose informal punishments, which implies that DF ￿ DI and SF ￿ SI.
The choice between formal and informal taxation thus entails a trade-o⁄ between enforcement (P)
and information (D and S).
Considering a limiting case may be useful for intuition. As PF ! 1 and DI ! 1, formal taxes
are limited by the IC constraints (hidden income and shirking) whereas informal taxes are limited by
IR constraints (punishments). Note that there are two potential sources of informational advantage
8We monetize labor payments by the high type using the high type￿ s wage rate, since this measure is most relevant
for considering the distribution of tax burdens.
9Note that social sanctions must be levied by individual community members, not by the social planner directly.
However, we can think of the social planner as coordinating the community on a particular equilibrium by choosing
the schedule of social sanctions to be implemented by the community. If each individual in the community￿ s cost of
enforcing a social sanction on someone else is less than the cost of receiving a social sanction themselves, there is
an equilibrium where everyone in the community enforces the social sanction on non tax payers, as well as enforces
the social sanction on anyone who deviates and does not enforce a social sanction when they are supposed to do so.
Perroni and Scharf (2007) note that any tax schedule must ultimately be sustained by the collective willingness of
the group to enforce the schedule, and Fehr and Gachter (2000) discuss the willingness of individuals to punish free
riders even if such punishments are costly.
15in the informal system: communities e⁄ectively have more information about true earnings ability
and they are better able to monitor labor payments. Either of these advantages is su¢ cient to
generate the result that informal taxation may be preferable to formal taxation; we believe both
are relevant in explaining the observed stylized facts, as we discuss below.
2.2 The informal tax framework and the stylized facts
2.2.1 The choice between formal and informal taxes
It is straightforward to see that loosening any of the constraints faced by the local government will
weakly allow it to achieve higher social welfare. This framework therefore suggests that informal
taxation is likely to result in a social welfare improvement relative to formal taxation when: (1) the
ability of the community to levy social sanctions (PI) is high; (2) there is more available information
about incomes informally than formally (DF < DI); and (3) the ability to monitor labor payments
informally is greater than the ability to monitor formally (SF < SI).
The prevalence of informal taxation throughout our sample of developing countries, particularly
in rural areas, is consistent with the existing evidence that informal insurance and credit markets
may function more e⁄ectively in rural areas, where information is better and villagers are better
able to levy informal sanctions for default (Townsend 1995, Besley and Coate 1995, Banerjee and
Newman 1998, Ghatak 1999). The ability to verify income legally may also be more di¢ cult in
developing countries, since many individuals work in or can easily shift into the informal sector.10
Unsurprisingly, informal taxation mechanisms are not generally observed in developed countries,
where it is harder to hide income and where social sanctions may be less e⁄ective.
Our model has considered the choice between formal and informal taxation made by a given
local government. Even within developing countries, information and social enforcement are likely
to be e⁄ective within small communities. This is consistent with the observation that informal
taxes tend to be levied at local levels, rather than by higher levels of government.
The framework also clari￿es why labor payments are more commonly observed in informal
taxation systems rather than in formal tax systems. Although labor payments are always desirable
as a screening device, they are also likely to be hard to verify legally. Therefore, the community can
more easily make use of labor payments as a screening device through the informal system. Note
that labor taxes are sometimes implemented through the formal tax schedule. Systems of corvee
labor, for example, were common at one time in Europe and elsewhere, and mandatory labor taxes
still exist in some countries, such as Vietnam. It may be that in at least some of these contexts,
local landlords or o¢ cials did not have to meet the burden of proof required by a court in order to
punish non-compliers, resulting in a high SF.11
2.2.2 The distribution and form of informal taxes
The informal tax model makes a number of predictions about the distribution and form of informal
tax payments. As discussed above, the framework suggests that informal tax payments should be
10Similarly, while landholding may be legally veri￿able in theory, land taxes in developing countries have also
proven di¢ cult to implement in practice (Burgess and Stern 1993).
11A number of studies have documented substantial absenteeism in sectors such as health and education in devel-
oping countries (e.g., Banerjee and Du￿ o 2006), which suggests that the e⁄ectiveness of formal public works projects
may be constrained by shirking as well.
16increasing with household expenditures. We ￿nd that the elasticity of total payment with respect to
household expenditure is positive in all countries (shown in Table 6), consistent with the prediction
of the model. Moreover, in the simple two-type case, it will be optimal for the public good to be
￿nanced solely by the high types if income inequality is su¢ ciently high and the planner has the
ability to satisfy the high type￿ s IR and hidden income IC constraints. The data is also consistent
with this prediction: we observe signi￿cantly positive participation gradients in the majority of
sample countries (Table 6).
In our simple framework, we have focused on the local government making a choice between
formal and informal taxes. In practice, the optimal solution may involve the government levying
both types of taxes. The observation that formal direct taxes are generally more progressive than
informal taxes could result from local governments levying formal taxes until D binds. While such
a formal tax system could be progressive, once D binds, a marginal expansion of the formal tax
system could then only be achieved by a (very regressive) poll tax. The local government might
instead choose to expand ￿nancing through informal taxes, where some degree of redistribution
can be achieved by making use of the higher information (D and S) available informally. The fact
that formal direct taxes tend to be very small (Figure 1) is consistent with the idea that local
governments are constrained in their ability to levy formal taxes, i.e., D may be binding.12
Our framework also rationalizes the prevalence of labor payments observed in the data. In the
￿rst best case, the government will be indi⁄erent between having the low type pay in labor versus
money. In our framework, the government will always prefer to have the low type pay in labor
if the shirking constraint does not bind, since doing so allows the government to extract greater
payments from those with (unobservably) higher income. If the shirking constraint does bind, the
low type may make payments in both money and labor, consistent with what we observe in the
data (Table 3, Panel B). Conversely, high types should pay in money rather than in labor, which
is what we observe in almost all countries (Table 8).
2.3 Extensions to multiple types
This section discusses two extensions of the model. First, we consider the case where the low
type￿ s wage is above the unskilled wage rate, so that having the low type pay in labor imposes
social costs. Second, we consider what happens when we introduce more than two types into the
model. Together, these two extensions allow the model to closely match all of the stylized facts
demonstrated above.
First, consider the case when both the high and low wages are above the unskilled wage rate.
Speci￿cally, suppose that a fraction ￿ of the population earns wage wH and a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ earns
wage wM, where wH > wM. The labor payments of each type are valued by the government at
wage rate wL; where wL < wM: The enforcement, hidden income and shirking constraints are the
same as above, with the di⁄erence that the low skilled type is now receiving wage wM and paying
taxes ￿MwM +￿M. In this case, the general pattern of the equilibrium ￿with the high type paying
more in total and the high type never paying labor taxes ￿still holds, i.e.:
Remark 4 Even if wM > wL, ￿H = 0 and ￿H > ￿M +wM￿M under conditions analogous to those
given in Remarks 1 and 3.
12By contrast, indirect formal taxes (VAT) are large, but these tend to be levied by state and national governments
and could be administratively di¢ cult to administer at the local level.
17Proof. We denote the low type￿ s income and tax payments by the subscript M; to di⁄erentiate
them from the notation for the unskilled wage rate at which government values labor, wL:The fact
that at the optimum level of payments ￿H = 0 can be shown using a proof similar to the one used
for Remark 1 with the additional condition that if SCM does not bind, then it must be the case
that D > u(wM(1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H) ￿ u(wM(1 ￿ ￿M) ￿ ￿M) in order for HIM to be satis￿ed.
To show that the tax payments are strictly increasing in income, the proof is similar to the one
used to prove Remark 3.
The key di⁄erence if wM > wL is that using labor as a screening device now has real social
costs, so it a⁄ects the attractiveness of using labor as a screening device. Nevertheless, we show
with a numerical example that it is still possible to obtain similar equilibria, i.e.:
Remark 5 Even if wM > wL, it is still possible to obtain an equilibrium where the high type pays
only in money and the low type pays only in labor.
Example 1 Let U(yi;g) = ln(yi)+￿g; where yi = wi(1￿￿i)￿￿i: We take wH = 9; wM = 4;wL =
3:5;￿ = 1=3;P = 1;D = ln(10=7);S = ln(3=2), G=N = 2 and ￿ = 2:
In the ￿rst best, when no constraints bind, the optimal solution would involve ￿H = 16=3 and
￿M = 1=3:The social planner would not use any labor taxes since both individuals￿labor is publicly
valued at a lower rate than their outside wage.
If we introduce the enforcement, hidden income and shirking constraints, then the hidden income
constraint for the high type would not be satis￿ed at the ￿rst-best values of ￿H and ￿M. Thus, labor
would have to be used as a screening device to make the low type￿ s tax mix less attractive to the high
type. By requiring the low type to pay some taxes in labor, the high type￿ s utility cost of switching
to the low type￿ s tax mix is increased since the high type values his labor at a higher wage rate than
the government. However, the introduction of labor payments also increases the low type￿ s total tax
payment, since his labor is also valued at a lower rate than his outside wage. Thus, P;D and S
must be high enough so that the constraints hold even after these changes in the tax mix.
In this example, after switching the low type￿ s payment to labor instead of money, the hidden
income constraint for the high type will be satis￿ed with equality. Solving the constrained maximiza-
tion numerically, at the optimal level, ￿￿
H = 4:26; ￿￿
H = 0 and ￿￿
M = 0;￿￿
M ’ 0:25: The total tax
payment for the low type increases to wM￿M ’ 1; re￿ecting the need to use the low type￿ s payment
as a screening device. One can check, for example, that welfare under this scenario is greater than,
for example, setting ￿H = ￿L, or setting ￿L = 0 and setting ￿H and ￿L such HIH binds.
Note that we can always guarantee that it will continue to be optimal to provide the public good
by setting ￿ high enough.
The model thus provides a potential explanation for labor payments made by those with an
opportunity cost above the unskilled wage rate, despite the fact that these in-kind payments are
ine¢ cient.
Second, we examine the case when there are three types in the model. With three types, we
can simultaneously consider participation gradients (i.e., does the household pay anything at all)
and the quantity paid conditional on participating. With a numerical example we can show the
following possibility result:
Remark 6 If there are multiple types and if the cost of hiding income increases with the amount
of income hidden, it is possible to get both a positive participation gradient and a positive income
gradient conditional on participating.
18Example 2 As in the previous example, let U(yi;g) = ln(yi) + ￿g; where yi = wi(1 ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿i:
Assume there are three types of individuals in the community: high-skilled, medium-skilled and low-
skilled, each representing a share ￿ = 1=3 of the population. We take wH = 11; wM = 5;wL = 4:5;
G=N = 2 and ￿ = 2:Let Dij denote the utility cost for individual of type i to hide income and
pretend to be of type j. Assume the punishment and utility cost of shirking P and S are identical
for all types. We let P = 1, S = ln(3=2); DHM = DMH = ln(1:45); DHL = DLH = ln(1:9);
DML = DLM = ln(1:3): Notice that the cost of hiding income is increasing with the amount hidden
in such a way that switching to the medium type￿ s tax rates is always more attractive for the high
type than switching to the low type￿ s tax rates.
In the ￿rst best case, when no constraints bind, the optimal allocation involves ￿H = 6;￿M = 0,
￿L = 0 and no labor payments. This allocation re￿ects the large di⁄erence in income between the
high type and the other two types. However, at this allocation, the hidden income constraint would
not hold for the high type, who would have an incentive to switch to be the medium type￿ s schedule.
Therefore, the constrained maximization problem will use labor payments as a method of making the
medium type￿ s payment less attractive to the high type. (In this example, the large gap between the
high and medium wages makes increasing the medium type￿ s labor payments preferable to increasing
his monetary payments.)
Solving the constrained maximization problem numerically yields ￿H = 5; ￿M = 0, ￿M = 0:214;
￿L = 0 and ￿L = 0: In this example, we obtain a case in which the lowest type is not required to pay
anything, the medium-skilled type is required to supply labor, and the high-skilled type only pays in
money.
Note that we can always guarantee that it will continue to be optimal to provide the public good
by setting ￿ high enough.
This example provides parameter values for which the pattern outlined in the above remark
will hold at the optimal solution. Moreover, in this numerical example, it is also be optimal for
the middle type, whose wage rate is greater than the unskilled wage rate, to pay in the form of
labor, since these payments serve as a screening device. We have thus provided an example that
encompasses many of the stylized facts: a positive participation gradient, a positive income gradient
conditional on paying, prevalent labor payments, a steeper gradient on money payments than on
labor payments, and labor payments by those whose incomes are greater than the unskilled wage
rate.
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